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When people want to identify the causes of an event, assign credit or blame, or learn from their
mistakes, they often reflect on how things could have gone differently. In this kind of reasoning,
one considers a counterfactual world in which some events are different from their real-world
counterparts and considers what else would have changed. Researchers have recently proposed
several probabilistic models that aim to capture how people do (or should) reason about coun-
terfactuals. We present a new model and show that it accounts better for human inferences
than several alternative models. Our model builds on the work of Pearl (2000), and extends
his approach in a way that accommodates backtracking inferences and that acknowledges the
difference between counterfactual interventions and counterfactual observations. We present
six new experiments and analyze data from four experiments carried out by Rips (2010), and
the results suggest that the new model provides an accurate account of both mean human judg-
ments and the judgments of individuals.
In addition to reasoning about actual states of affairs, hu-
mans often reason about what might have been. A doctor
might ask “if Alice had not been treated with the experimen-
tal drug, would she have survived?” and a parent might tell
a child that “if you had been paying attention, you wouldn’t
have gotten hurt.” As these examples suggest, counterfac-
tual reasoning helps us to evaluate our past decisions, and
to learn what mistakes to avoid in the future (Mandel &
Lehman, 1996; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der
Pligt, 2000; Spellman, Kincannon, & Stose, 2005; Epstude
& Roese, 2008). The answers to counterfactual questions
also allow us to assign blame for harmful outcomes, and to
give credit for beneficial outcomes (Spellman & Kincannon,
2001).
There has been a great deal of research into the factors
that influence counterfactual judgments, and several formal
models of counterfactual reasoning have been proposed. Of
these, Pearl’s (2000, 2013) account has been especially in-
fluential. Pearl’s model provides a clear account of how in-
formation about causal structure and probability should influ-
ence counterfactual judgments, but falls short as a descriptive
account of human behavior in certain contexts. This paper
describes a new model that improves on Pearl’s as an account
of human counterfactual reasoning.
The issues that we consider can be introduced using a
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simple running example. Imagine that cooking some bacon
activates a smoke alarm, which in turn disturbs the neigh-
bors. Let B denote cooking bacon, S denote the smoke alarm
activating, and N denote the neighbors being disturbed, as
depicted in the graph in Figure 1a. All three variables are
binary variables that can be true (t) or false ( f ). Following
Pearl (2000) and others (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001;
Luhmann & Ahn, 2005; Schölkopf et al., 2012), our ap-
proach assumes that causal relationships are intrinsically de-
terministic and that apparently unreliable or stochastic rela-
tionships are influenced by unobserved factors. For example,
unobserved factors such as the direction of air currents may
help to determine whether cooking bacon triggers the smoke
alarm on any given occasion. Under this view, causal systems
can be viewed as collections of effects, where each effect is a
deterministic function of its known causes and zero or more
hidden variables. The hidden variables are exogenous: that
is, they are not effects of any of the observed variables. A
causal system expressed in this way is called a functional
causal model. Figure 1b shows an example in which exoge-
nous variables UB, US and UN have been added to the sys-
tem in Figure 1a to capture background conditions that in-
fluence the causal links in our example. Figure 1b indicates
that UB determines whether or not bacon is cooked, that US
and B jointly determine whether the smoke alarm activates,
and that UN and S jointly determine whether the neighbors
are disturbed.
Suppose that B, S, and N are all known to be true: we
cooked some bacon, the alarm activated, and the neighbors
were disturbed. We will consider counterfactual questions
such as “if the smoke alarm had not activated, would bacon
still have been cooked?” (Figure 1). Our approach maintains
a functional causal model for the actual world in which B, S
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Figure 1. A causal graphical model and a corresponding functional causal model. The conditional probability tables at each
node give the probability that a variable is present (t) or absent ( f ), conditional on its causes. (a) A causal graphical model in
which each relationship is a noisy effect of its parents. (b) A functional causal model that introduces exogenous variables to
the model in (a) and assumes that each variable is a deterministic function of its parents, denoted by double boundaries on the
nodes. (c) A table illustrating a counterfactual query. Even though all three variables were present in the real-world, we might
reason about a counterfactual world in which the smoke alarm had not sounded.
and N are all set to true, and a second model for the counter-
factual world in which S is set to false. The graph structures
and the probability distributions for the two models are iden-
tical, but the variables in the two models may take different
values. To specify how the models are related, our approach
makes use of the notion of stability. When stability is high,
the exogenous variables in the two models are likely to take
identical values. For example, when stability is high, the air
currents (variable US) are expected to be identical across the
real and counterfactual worlds. When stability is low, the
exogenous variables are generated independently for the two
models, and may therefore take different values.
The counterfactual model supports two different methods
of reasoning about the counterfactual scenario in Figure 1.
The first method treats the counterfactual premise as an in-
tervention. For example, we might imagine a counterfactual
world in which somebody directly intervened on the smoke
alarm to disable it. The second method treats the counterfac-
tual premise as an observation. For example, we might imag-
ine that we had simply observed the alarm to be inactive. The
two methods can lead to different conclusions. For example,
if reasoning about the counterfactual intervention, we might
conclude that bacon would still have been cooked on that day,
and that the alarm failed to activate only because it had been
disabled. If reasoning about the counterfactual observation,
we might conclude that bacon was not cooked in the coun-
terfactual world, because otherwise there would be no good
explanation of the alarm’s failure to activate. Sloman and
Lagnado (2005) have previously shown that people distin-
guish between counterfactual interventions and counterfac-
tual observations, but ours is the first psychological model
that highlights this distinction.
Because our approach builds on the structural model of
counterfactual reasoning developed by Pearl (2000, 2013),
we refer to it as the extended structural model or ESM for
short. Pearl’s approach can be viewed as a special case of the
ESM in which stability is maximal, and in which counter-
factual premises are interpreted as interventions. We will ar-
gue, however, that this special case is not enough to account
for human counterfactual reasoning. In particular, we will
show how our approach goes beyond Pearl’s by accounting
for backtracking counterfactuals, such as the inference that
bacon would not have been cooked if the alarm had failed to
activate. Given the information in Figure 1c, the ESM allows
for the possibility that variables upstream of S might explain
the counterfactual premise that S is false, and can therefore
infer that B is likely to be false. Pearl’s approach, in contrast,
predicts that upstream variables will be unchanged.
Although the ESM relies on functional causal models,
there are alternative accounts of counterfactual reasoning
that allow causal relationships to be intrinsically stochas-
tic (Hiddleston, 2005; Rips, 2010; Dehghani, Iliev, & Kauf-
mann, 2012). Of these accounts, the framework that is best
developed as a psychological model was proposed and eval-
uated by Rips (2010). One strength of Rips’ account is that
it is able to account for backtracking counterfactuals. We
present several experiments, however, which suggest that the
ESM performs better than Rips’ model as an account of hu-
man reasoning.
The counterfactual inferences that we consider correspond
COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING 3
to inferences about conditionals of the form “if the alarm
had not activated, then bacon would still have been cooked.”
Our work therefore contributes to an extensive literature that
has explored how people reason about conditional state-
ments (Stalnaker, 1981; Edgington, 1995; Evans & Over,
2004). The ESM is related most directly to previous ac-
counts of conditional reasoning that rely on probabilistic in-
ference (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004;
Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007;
Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). Among these accounts
are some that focus specifically on probabilistic inference
over causal models (Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011; Fern-
bach & Erb, 2013). All of the models compared in this paper
can therefore be viewed as attempts to extend the causal ap-
proach to conditional reasoning in a way that supports infer-
ences about counterfactual conditionals.
In the next section, we summarize previous causal models
of counterfactual reasoning and introduce our new approach
in detail. We then present a series of experiments that test
our model’s core commitments and compare it against sev-
eral alternatives.
Theories of counterfactual reasoning
Counterfactual reasoning has been extensively discussed
by philosophers, linguists, and psychologists, and we will not
be able to do justice to all of the work in this area. Instead,
we begin by discussing some ideas that are widely shared by
accounts of counterfactual reasoning, and then focus in detail
on several recent theories that make use of causal Bayes nets.
Suppose that an individual is asked to evaluate an argu-
ment of the form “If P, then Q.” Many theorists propose
that the individual does so by (1) adding P hypothetically to
her set of beliefs, (2) making some adjustments so that the
resulting set is coherent, then (3) assessing Q in light of this
adjusted set of beliefs (Oaksford & Chater, 2010a; Unter-
huber, 2013). This three step procedure is often called the
Ramsey test, and it lies at the heart of many theories of con-
ditional reasoning in general and of counterfactual reasoning
in particular. All of the theories that we will consider are
broadly consistent with the Ramsey test.
Perhaps the most influential account of counterfactual
reasoning makes use of a similarity measure over possible
worlds (Stalnaker, 1981; Lewis, 1973b). Roughly speaking,
this account proposes that P→ Q is valid if Q is true in all
of the worlds that make P true and are as as similar as pos-
sible to the actual world. The possible worlds account in-
cludes room for many different theories that define similarity
in different ways. For example, Pearl (2000) showed that his
account of counterfactual reasoning is a special case of the
possible worlds approach if similarity is defined in a certain
way.
As we describe later, our new theory can also be formu-
lated in terms of possible worlds. Unlike most previous the-
ories, however, we propose that counterfactual inferences
are generated by reasoning about a diverse set of possible
worlds, including worlds that are not as similar as possible to
the actual world. Our approach may therefore seem incom-
patible with stage (2) of the Ramsey test, at least as this test
is often described. For example, Harper (1981, p. 5) writes
that the individual should make the “minimal revision” re-
quired to assume the antecedent P, and Bennett (2003, p. 29)
suggests that the individual should adjust her belief system
“in the most natural, conservative manner.” For a possible
worlds account, this minimality assumption corresponds to
the idea that counterfactuals should be evaluated by consider-
ing only possible worlds that differ in minimal respects from
the actual world. Although this minimality assumption is
sometimes taken for granted, it does not appear in the foot-
note that is the original source of the Ramsey test (Ramsey,
1978), and therefore does not seem to be an essential com-
ponent of this test.
Although the minimality assumption is extremely com-
mon, philosophers have offered some reasons to question
it (Bennett, 2003; McDermott, 2007). Several authors point
out that the assumption may not be appropriate when rea-
soning about ordinal variables (Jackson, 1977; Slote, 1978).
For example, Bennett (2003, p. 180) gives the example of an
individual with four siblings who is evaluating the argument
“if I had more siblings than I do, I would have had exactly
five.” The minimality assumption suggests that the argument
is valid, but it seems reasonable for the individual to think
about possible worlds in which he had five, six, and per-
haps even more siblings. Philosophers have also suggested
that the assumption may not be appropriate when reasoning
about stochastic events (Walters, 2009; Nozick, 1981). This
prior philosophical work provides some justification for con-
sidering a theory that abandons the minimality assumption,
but the ultimate test of our new theory will be whether or
not it accounts for empirical data. In later sections we de-
scribe experiments designed to compare our theory with sev-
eral prominent alternatives, and argue that the results raise
serious challenges for any theory that relies on the minimal-
ity assumption.
Causal Bayes nets
The theories that we will compare most extensively are all
formulated in terms of Causal Bayes nets, or CBNs (Pearl,
2000). This section reviews the properties of CBNs, and the
following sections explain how CBNs can be used to develop
computational accounts of counterfactual reasoning.
CBNs were originally proposed as a framework for un-
derstanding causal systems and have their origins in Bayes
nets, a formalism that is useful for efficiently representing
and reasoning about stochastic systems. A causal Bayes net,
such as the one shown in Figure 1a, includes a set of nodes
corresponding to variables and a set of directed edges — de-
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picted as arrows between nodes — that capture the causal
dependencies between variables. Every arrow in Figure 1a
represents a direct causal relationship between one of the
nodes, e.g., B is a direct cause of S. To complete a CBN
one must specify precisely how each variable is influenced
by its direct causes. For discrete variables, this information
can be represented using conditional probability tables like
those under each of the nodes in Figure 1a. These tables can
capture the form of the relationship between variables, as in
the tables under nodes S and N, or how common a particular
state is, as in the table under B.
Causal Bayes nets support two basic operations, condi-
tioning and intervention, which correspond to different ways
in which a variable can take a particular value. If we ob-
serve that a variable has taken a particular value, e.g. S = f ,
we can predict the values of other variables by computing
their probability distributions conditional on the observation.
On the other hand, if we are reasoning about the effects of
experiments or outside influences on a system, this sort of
reasoning is not warranted: if we alter variable S, there will
be consequences for its effect N, but not its cause B. In a
causal Bayes net, an intervention detaches the target variable
from its causes, removing the relevant edges, and only then
do we compute the conditional distributions for the remain-
ing variables.
Some of the models we will discuss use a formalism re-
lated to causal Bayes nets, called functional causal models
(FCMs) by Pearl (2000). FCMs differ from causal Bayes
nets in that they do not treat causal relationships as inher-
ently stochastic, but instead represent noise and uncertainty
using hidden, exogenous variables. For example, the CBN
in Figure 1a shows stochastic relationships between B and S
and between S and N. The FCM in Figure 1b introduces three
exogenous variables UB, US, and UN , and indicates that the
endogenous variables B, S, and N follow deterministically
from their parents (denoted by double-edged boundaries).
Like Figure 1a, each variable has an associated probability
table, but the only probabilities that differ from 0 or 1 are the
rates of the three exogenous variables.
The FCM in Figure 1b and the CBN in Figure 1a induce
the same joint distribution on variables B, S, and N, as can
be shown by marginalizing over the exogenous variables. As
a result, the two models give the same answers to questions
like “what is the probability of S if B is present?” Similarly,
the models respond identically to causal interventions on en-
dogenous variables, which can never influence the exogenous
variables. Despite these similarities, Pearl has argued that
FCMs should be preferred to CBNs, in part because FCMs
provide a more complete account of counterfactual reason-
ing. We will assess this argument in later sections by com-
paring models that rely on FCMs with models that rely on
CBNs. The difference between FCMs and CBNs is directly
relevant to the long-running debate about whether causation
is truly deterministic (Hume, 1748; Reichenbach, 1956), and
whether most people implicitly believe that causal relation-
ships are deterministic (Schulz & Sommerville, 2006; Frosch
& Johnson-Laird, 2011). Our new model relies on FCMs,
and is therefore most compatible with the position that peo-
ple are causal determinists.
Although CBNs and FCMs capture different views about
determinism, the similarities between these approaches
should not be overlooked. Both approaches make use
of probabilistic inference over structured representations,
and both belong to a broader body of work that has used
Bayes nets to account for multiple aspects of causal cog-
nition (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011). For example, psychol-
ogists have used Bayes nets to model how people learn
causal relationships (Gopnik et al., 2004), explain ob-
served events (Halpern & Pearl, 2001), predict unobserved
events (Gopnik et al., 2004), and interpret causal condition-
als (Ali et al., 2011). The next section describes several mod-
els of counterfactual reasoning that belong to this same tra-
dition, including the new model introduced in this paper.
Bayes net theories of counterfactual reasoning
This section describes several Bayes net models of coun-
terfactual reasoning, including several previous models along
with the new model that we have developed. Table 1 lists
these models along with their distinguishing characteristics.
We will focus throughout on retrospective counterfactu-
als, or counterfactuals that relate to events that have already
occurred, with premises that are contrary to fact. The ba-
con scenario in Figure 1 is one example in which certain
events have taken place (e.g. the alarm has sounded) and we
are interested in how these events might have turned out dif-
ferently. Retrospective counterfactuals can be distinguished
from prospective counterfactuals, which involve hypotheti-
cal future events. For example, a prospective counterfac-
tual might state that if we cook bacon tomorrow, the smoke
alarm will sound. Psychologists often focus on the differ-
ences between retrospective and prospective counterfactuals,
but philosophers are more inclined to group them together
as instances of hypothetical statements (Woodward, 2011).
Each of the models in Table 1 can handle both retrospective
and prospective counterfactuals, but we focus on retrospec-
tive counterfactuals because all of the models make the same
predictions when applied to prospective counterfactuals.
Pearl’s Structural Model
Pearl’s theory of counterfactuals (Pearl, 2000, 2013),
which we will call the Structural Model (SM), provides a
starting point for all other models we consider. Pearl’s ap-
proach relies on three basic assumptions. First, the SM relies
on functional causal models, and is therefore committed to
the idea that events which may appear stochastic would be
revealed as deterministic if all of the relevant causal variables
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Table 1
Distinguishing characteristics of the models we consider, including Pearl’s Structural Model (SM), the Extended Structural
Model (ESM), the Unattached Structural Model (USM), and the Minimal Networks Model (MNM).
Feature SM ESM USM MNM
Considers only counterfactual worlds that are minimally different from the
actual world.
yes no no yes
Represents noise/uncertainty in terms of hidden variables rather than inher-
ently stochastic relationships.
yes yes no no
Supports backtracking counterfactuals. no yes yes yes
Distinguishes between counterfactual intervention and observation. no yes no yes
were known. As described already, Figure 1 shows how a
stochastic causal model for our bacon-cooking scenario can
be converted into a functional model by adding hidden ex-
ogenous variables.
The SM’s second assumption is that these exogenous vari-
ables retain their values in any counterfactual scenario one
might imagine. For example, if the relationship between
cooking bacon and the alarm activating is mediated by air
currents, the SM assumes that these air currents are the same
across the real and counterfactual worlds. This second as-
sumption ensures that the SM considers only counterfactual
worlds that are minimally different from the actual world,
and can therefore be viewed as a version of the minimality
assumption described earlier. Figure 2b illustrates how this
minimality assumption can be captured using a twin network,
in which every observable real-world variable has a corre-
sponding counterfactual “twin”.1 Absent any counterfactual
premise that differs from the real world, the values of the
twin variables are identical to those of their counterparts, be-
cause they are deterministic functions of the same exogenous
variables.
The SM’s third assumption is that counterfactual premises
are represented by imagining that an intervention has oc-
curred in the counterfactual world. For example, when rea-
soning about a counterfactual world in which the smoke
alarm does not activate, the SM assumes that the alarm was
prevented from activating by a direct intervention. Such an
intervention, like an idealized experiment, sets the value of
the alarm variable to inactive while decoupling the alarm
variable from its normal causes. Informally, under Pearl’s
account, the question “would B be true if S were true?” is
equivalent to asking “would B be true if you had forced S to
be true without influencing its causes or introducing any side
effects?” The SM thus predicts that only the direct and in-
direct effects of a counterfactual premise will differ between
the real and counterfactual worlds.
Given these assumptions and a specification of the causal
relationships between variables, the SM makes precise pre-
dictions about which counterfactual inferences follow from
a particular premise. The model has achieved a number of
successes. It makes intuitive predictions about how people
should distinguish between statements like “if Oswald didn’t
kill Kennedy, then someone else did" and statements like
“if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, then someone else would
have" (Adams, 1970; Pearl, 2013). The SM also shows how
the effects of hypothetical experiments can be estimated from
historical data (Shpitser & Pearl, 2009), and how one can
identify the ways in which experimental results generalize to
new contexts (Pearl & Bareinboim, 2011).
Despite these successes, the SM sometimes makes pre-
dictions that differ from human judgments, which limits its
value as a psychological (as opposed to normative) theory.
For example, unlike humans, the SM never makes backtrack-
ing inferences. Recall that backtracking occurs when a rea-
soner adjusts a cause in order to explain a counterfactual
premise involving an effect. For example, a reasoner may
decide that if the smoke alarm had not activated, then bacon
would probably not have been cooked. This backtracking
inference seems natural if the smoke detector is known to
be reliable, and backtracking can be expected in other cases
in which the relationship between cause and effect is highly
reliable. For instance, if a cat falls into a pond and gets wet,
it seems natural to infer that if the cat had not become wet, it
would probably not have fallen into the pond.
A second limitation of the SM is that it always treats a
counterfactual premise as an intervention, regardless of the
specific character of that premise. In non-counterfactual
causal reasoning tasks, people draw a strong distinction be-
tween observations and interventions (Hagmayer, Sloman,
Lagnado, & Waldmann, 2007), and Sloman and Lagnado
(2005) have shown that people are more prone to making
1Richardson and Robins (2013) discuss some limitations of twin
networks and propose a different way of capturing counterfactual
worlds using graphs. Shpitser and Pearl (2008) also propose a
graphical representation that improves on twin networks. We will
not discuss these approaches here because both make the same pre-
dictions as the twin-network approach for all of the applications we
consider.
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Figure 2. A comparison between three accounts of counter-
factual reasoning using a causal chain scenario in which B
causes S, which in turn causes N. The nodes B′, S′ and N′
represent counterfactual values of B, S, and N. (a) An ac-
count that neglects the true state of the world when making
counterfactual inferences, and treats the counterfactual world
as if it were a completely new scenario. We refer to this ac-
count as the unattached structural model (USM). Exogenous
variables are denoted with UB, US and UN , and nodes with
double-edged boundaries are deterministic functions of their
parents. (b) Pearl’s Structural Model (SM) represented using
a twin network. Information from the real world is used to
make inferences about the exogenous variables, which in turn
inform counterfactual inferences. (c) The Extended Struc-
tural Model (ESM), which extends the SM’s twin network
by allowing exogenous variables to take different values in
the real and counterfactual worlds.
backtracking inferences when a premise is a counterfactual
observation than when the premise is an intervention. For ex-
ample, a counterfactual scenario in which the smoke alarm is
simply observed to be inactive seems more likely to produce
backtracking than a scenario in which the alarm is forced to
be inactive.
The SM allows counterfactual observations to be captured
in two different ways, but neither approach leads to back-
tracking. The first approach represents the observation of
an event B by introducing a causal variable Bobs that is an
effect of B. An observation of B is treated as an interven-
tion that sets the value of Bobs and severs the link between
Bobs and its parent. As a result, a counterfactual observation
of B is uninformative about B’s value in the counterfactual
world, and therefore uninformative about the causes of B.
The second, more conventional approach is to treat an obser-
vation of event B as information about the actual state of B.
In this case, the SM treats a counterfactual observation like
any other counterfactual premise, and the observed value of
B still tells us nothing about B’s causes in the counterfactual
world.2
The limitations of the SM suggest that a successful psy-
chological model of counterfactual reasoning should per-
mit backtracking under some circumstances and should ex-
plain how humans distinguish between counterfactual obser-
vations and counterfactual interventions. One might argue
that the SM is a normative model, and should not be ex-
pected to succeed as a psychological account. The next sec-
tion, however, describes a simple extension of the SM that
satisfies our psychological desiderata while inheriting many
of the SM’s appealing properties.
The Extended Structural Model
The SM assumes that all exogenous variables in the coun-
terfactual world take values that match their real-world val-
ues. We now describe a new model that relaxes this mini-
mality assumption and allows for the possibility that the ex-
ogenous variables take counterfactual values that differ from
their real-world values. For example, suppose again that vari-
able US in Figure 1 represents whether or not the prevailing
air currents allow bacon smoke to reach the alarm. Even if
US is true in the real world, our new model allows for the pos-
sibility that the air currents may be different in the counter-
factual world. Our model builds on several key ideas behind
the SM, including the idea that causal relationships are re-
vealed as deterministic once all relevant variables have been
taken into account. We therefore refer to our approach as the
Extended Structural Model, or ESM for short.
2A third alternative is to set aside the twin network and inter-
ventions in the case of counterfactual observations, and instead
treat them as non-counterfactual observations. We report the per-
formance of this model in Appendix C.
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The ESM includes a stability parameter s that captures the
extent to which exogenous variables are expected to match
across the real and counterfactual worlds. If stability is high
(s close to 1), then the exogenous variables are very likely
to match across these worlds. If stability is low (s close to
0), then the real and counterfactual exogenous variables are
only weakly coupled. The role of stability can be quantified
as follows:
P(U ′i |Ui) = sδ(Ui)+(1− s)Pi(U ′i ), (1)
where Ui is an exogenous variable in the real world and U ′i is
its counterfactual counterpart. Equation 1 can be interpreted
as a probabilistic recipe for generating U ′i . With probability
s, the value of U ′i is generated by simply copying the value
of Ui, and with probability (1−s), the value of U ′i is sampled
from Pi(·), the prior distribution over Ui. The delta distribu-
tion δ(Ui) is a probability distribution that takes value 1 at Ui
and value 0 at every other point.
If a causal model includes multiple exogenous variables,
it is straightforward to allow different values of the stability
parameter for each of these variables. Previous research has
shown that some variables are more mutable than others—
that is, more likely to be altered when reasoning about coun-
terfactual scenarios (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Using dif-
ferent stability values for different exogenous variables pro-
vides a way to capture this insight. Our experiments, how-
ever, deliberately use variables that are all of the same type,
and we will therefore use a single value of the stability pa-
rameter for all exogenous variables. Formulating the model
in this way minimizes the number of numerical parameters
and therefore allows for a relatively strong test of our ap-
proach.
The predictions of the ESM can be captured using the ex-
tended twin network in Figure 2c. Unlike the standard twin
network in Figure 2b, the extended network includes exoge-
nous variables in the counterfactual world that may take val-
ues different from their corresponding variables in the real
world. In general, the values assigned to the counterfactual
exogenous variables will be influenced by the values of the
real-world exogenous variables, by prior beliefs, and by the
information conveyed by counterfactual premises.
Unlike the SM, the ESM can make backtracking infer-
ences and can distinguish between counterfactual observa-
tions and counterfactual interventions. We illustrate by ex-
plaining how the extended twin network in Figure 2c is used
to reason about observations and interventions. Figure 3
shows examples based on our bacon scenario. As before, we
assume that B (bacon cooked), S (smoke alarm activates) and
N (neighbors disturbed) are true in the real world, and that
S′ is false in the counterfactual world. Figure 3 shows how
the extended network can be used to reason about a counter-
factual observation of S. In this case we set B, S and N to
true and S′ to false, then compute the resulting probability
distribution on B. As described in Appendix A, this com-
putation can be carried out using any standard algorithm for
inference in Bayesian networks. When s = 0.5, the model in
Figure 3a predicts that P(B′ = t) = 0.487. In other words, the
model makes a backtracking inference and concludes that ba-
con was relatively unlikely to have been cooked in the coun-
terfactual world.
Figure 3b shows how the extended twin network is used
to reason about the scenario in which S′ is fixed by a coun-
terfactual intervention. As for the case just described, we
set B, S and N to true. Consistent with the standard treat-
ment of interventions in causal Bayes nets, we set S′ to false
and “mutilate” the graph by removing all incoming edges to
S′. Adjusting the graph in this way captures the fact that the
value of S′ was determined by an intervention rather than by
the parents of S′ in the graph. Any standard algorithm for
inference in Bayesian networks can then be used to compute
the probability that P(B′ = t). When s = 0.5, the model in
Figure 3b predicts that P(B′ = t) = 0.95. As suggested by
these examples, the ESM is compatible with the finding that
people are more likely to backtrack given counterfactual ob-
servations than given counterfactual interventions (Sloman
& Lagnado, 2005).
Two special cases of the ESM are important to consider.
If the exogenous variables are maximally stable (s = 1), then
the exogenous variables must match across these worlds, and
the ESM reduces to the SM. Because the exogenous vari-
ables must match, the extended network in Figure 2c be-
comes equivalent to the standard twin network in Figure 2b.
If stability takes its minimal possible value (s = 0), then U ′i
does not depend on Ui, and these two variables are drawn
independently from the distribution Pi(·). As a result, the ex-
tended network in Figure 2c becomes equivalent to the model
shown in Figure 2a. We will refer to this special case as the
USM, or “unattached structural model” because counterfac-
tual variables are detached from their real-world twins. To
our knowledge, the USM has not been proposed as a fully-
general model of counterfactual reasoning, but it is closely
related to the theory of counterfactual conditionals proposed
by Over et al. (2007).
The special cases just considered suffer from different
shortcomings. When s = 1, inferences about the counter-
factual exogenous variables are not sensitive to the counter-
factual premises. When s = 0, inferences about the coun-
terfactual exogenous variables are not sensitive to the true
state of the world. We propose that inferences about the
counterfactual exogenous variables are sensitive to both the
counterfactual premises and the true state of the world, and
therefore expect that the judgments of most individuals will
be consistent with stability values that lie between 0 and 1.
All results reported later in the paper are based on setting
s = 0.53, which is the value that provides the best account of
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our experimental data.3
Equation 1 can be viewed as a weighted combination of
the distribution on U ′i used by the SM and the distribution
used by the USM. As a result, the ESM might initially seem
equivalent to a weighted combination of the SM and the
USM. This weighted combination would be consistent with
the idea that some individuals always reason in accordance
with the USM (s = 0) and others make inferences according
to the SM’s predictions (s = 1). A variation on the same
idea is that each individual makes judgments consistent with
the SM’s predictions in some contexts and consistent with
the USM’s predictions in other contexts. Later, however, we
show that these proposals can be distinguished empirically
from the ESM. It turns out that a weighted combination at the
level of the exogenous variables (Equation 1) does not lead to
predictions that are weighted combinations at the level of the
whole model: that is, the ESM’s predictions are not weighted
combinations of the predictions of the SM and the USM.
We presented Equation 1 as a probabilistic procedure for
assigning values to the variables in the counterfactual world.
The stability parameter s, however, can also be interpreted
as a declarative characterization of the relationship between
the real and counterfactual worlds. Suppose that these two
worlds (along with many others) are generated by a branch-
ing process that produces a multiverse of possible worlds.
The stability parameter s can be defined as a decreasing func-
tion of the time that has elapsed since the two worlds sepa-
rated. Figure 2c shows two worlds, and the small black dots
capture the states of the exogenous variables at the instant
when the two worlds separated. The six arrows that issue
from these dots are identical in length, and this length repre-
sents how long the two worlds have been evolving separately.
As s approaches 1, the arrow length approaches zero, and
each exogenous variable U ′ becomes effectively identical to
U . As s approaches 0, the arrow length approaches infinity,
and U ′ and U effectively become independent draws from the
same prior. Full details are provided in Appendix A, which
includes a derivation of Equation 1.
CBN models of counterfactual reasoning
As mentioned earlier, Pearl has argued that functional
causal models (FCMs) provide a transparent account of
counterfactual reasoning, and the two models presented so
far both rely on FCMs. There are, however, alternative ap-
proaches to counterfactual reasoning that rely on stochastic
causal Bayes nets rather than FCMs. Here we focus on a pro-
posal due to Rips, who adapted Hiddleston’s (2005) theory
of counterfactuals to reconcile it with psychological data.
Rips’s Minimal Networks Model (MNM) is founded on
a minimality assumption, and proposes that people evaluate
counterfactual statements by considering only counterfactual
worlds that do not unnecessarily alter or “break” any causal
relationships. Figure 4 gives an example of a causal system
which describes four variables B, T , S, and N and the causal
relationships among them. We can imagine this as an exten-
sion of our bacon-cooking scenario, so that B denotes cook-
ing bacon, which is almost always true, T denotes burning
toast, which is sometimes true, and the smoke alarm acti-
vating, S, is always true if either of those causes is present.
For simplicity, we now assume that both S and N are deter-
ministic effects of their parents in Figure 4: for example, the
state of the neighbor variable N always matches the state of
the alarm variable S. Suppose that none of the four events
occurred in reality—all of the variables take the value f —
and we are asked “if the smoke alarm had activated, would
the bacon have been cooked?” The probability that the alarm
activates in the absence of B and T is zero, so it is necessary
to consider counterfactual worlds in which B or T is true.
However, given that both B and T are sufficient causes of S,
there is no requirement that they both be changed. Thus there
are two minimal networks, shown in Figure 4(b). Because
variable N has a cause (S) that is necessarily different in the
counterfactual world, N is said to be “up for grabs” rather
than a break, and can thus take any value that has a non-zero
probability given that S is true.
How does the MNM map a set of minimal networks on
to inferences about cooking bacon? Rips offers two ap-
proaches. The first is to count the number of minimal net-
works in which B is true, and divide that by the total number
of minimal networks, yielding P(B′ = t) = 0.5. The second
approach is to weight networks by how probable they are:
that is, by the joint probability of all of their variables given
the counterfactual premise. In the current example, the sec-
ond approach yields P(B′ = t) = 0.95, because the base rate
of B exceeds the base rate of T , and as a result the first min-
imal network in Figure 4 is more probable than the second.
In practice, the MNM makes predictions using a mixture of
these two approaches and random guessing, with the precise
mixture of these strategies determined by two free parame-
ters.
A noteworthy feature of the MNM is that non-minimal
networks never contribute to inferences, no matter how prob-
able they are. In Figure 4(b), for example, the bottom row is
out of consideration, no matter how likely it is that events B
and T are true in general. In contrast, the ESM does not make
a minimality assumption, and allows for the possibility that
B and T are both true in the counterfactual world. Our exper-
iments that contrast the MNM and the ESM will explore this
difference between the models, among other issues.
The original presentation of the MNM did not address the
difference between counterfactual interventions and counter-
factual observations. Rips and Edwards (2013), however,
point out that the theory can be extended to accommodate
this distinction, and we will evaluate the extended MNM ap-
3We also optimized the parameters used by all alternative mod-
els; see Appendix C for details.
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Figure 3. Differences between counterfactual observations and interventions under the ESM. Shaded nodes denote variables
that have known values due to observation or intervention. (a) An example of a counterfactual observation when the true
values of B, S, and N are known, and the counterfactual premise is that S′ is observed to be different. (b) The same scenario
under the counterfactual premise that an intervention has changed S′.
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Figure 4. Minimality under the Minimal Networks Model. (a) A causal system in which a variable S has two deterministic,
sufficient causes, along with a table giving the probabilities of effects given their causes. Each variable has two possible values:
t, for true, and f , for false. (b) The real-world values of the variables, the counterfactual premise, two worlds with minimal
breaks (breaks are denoted with gray backgrounds), and a world with non-minimal breaks.
proach that they briefly describe. To illustrate how interven-
tions are handled, consider the scenario in Figure 4, and sup-
pose that the counterfactual premise states that S had been
activated by means of an intervention. We add a new cause
of S to represent this intervention, and expand the conditional
probability table for S to capture the idea that the intervention
fixes the value of S. After expanding the network in this way,
standard MNM theory can be used to make inferences about
the other variables in the network.
As mentioned earlier, two key features of the MNM are
that it relies on stochastic models and that it does not treat
all counterfactual premises as interventions. Dehghani et al.
(2012) have developed a second psychological model shares
both features. According to Dehghani et al., backtracking is
an incremental process that only occurs if the counterfactual
premise is surprising in light of its causes. If some threshold
level of surprise is crossed, then those causes are assigned
new values such that the premise is no longer surprising.
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If those causes’ new values are themselves surprising, their
causes are updated as well, with the process continuing until
no relationship is too surprising, or no variables remain to be
updated. Unlike Rips’s MNM, Dehghani et al.’s model has
several aspects that are not formally specified, such as the
possibility that a learner’s tolerance for surprise changes over
time and the conditions under which multiple causes are si-
multaneously selected for updating. Given these ambiguities,
and the broad similarities between Dehghani’s and Rips’s
models, we will focus our attention on Rips’s approach.
We have now introduced several different models of coun-
terfactual reasoning that are summarized in Table 1. The first
is Pearl’s SM, which considers counterfactual worlds that
are maximally similar to the actual world in the sense that
they have matching exogenous variables. The second is the
ESM, which balances the similarity of counterfactual worlds
to the actual world against the prior probability of these coun-
terfactual worlds. The ESM inherits the SM’s approach to
noise and variability, but differs from the SM by allowing
backtracking inferences and distinguishing between counter-
factual interventions and counterfactual observations. Along
with the ESM, we described some related special cases and
alternatives, such as the USM, which ignores real-world val-
ues of variables, and mixtures of the SM and USM. Finally,
we described two existing models that allow causal relation-
ships to be intrinsically stochastic, and that explain back-
tracking in a way that is related to Hiddleston’s theory of
counterfactuals. The next section describes a set of experi-
ments that compares these models and assesses the specific
commitments of the ESM.
Experiments
We conducted several experiments with the goal of test-
ing the commitments of the ESM and distinguishing it from
other models on the basis of the features listed in Table 1.
All of our experiments shared the same basic form, and pre-
sented participants with information about causal structure,
probabilistic information, information about the true state of
the world and counterfactual premises. On the basis of that
information, participants made judgments about counterfac-
tual and non-counterfactual scenarios. One of our aims was
to assess the models’ ability to predict patterns of judgments
by individual participants, so we conducted all of our exper-
iments in a single batch: each participant saw every condi-
tion of every experiment. The experiments were presented in
random order in a single session.
Experiment 1 sets the stage for subsequent experiments,
and establishes that people expect that variables tend to be
stable between the real and counterfactual worlds given the
kinds of scenarios and cover stories that we present. In Ex-
periment 2, we assess backtracking behavior given coun-
terfactual observations and interventions, and compare the
ESM’s predictions to those of Pearl’s SM. Experiment 3 ex-
plores whether people’s counterfactual inferences are consis-
tent with the ESM’s commitment to deterministic relation-
ships and exogenous hidden causes. Experiments 4 and 5
compare the ESM to the Minimal Networks Model as de-
scribed by Rips (2010), and Experiment 6 compares the ESM
to mixtures of different strategies. The counterfactual condi-
tions in all experiments were conducted on a within-subjects
basis, with each participant participating in every experiment
in a randomly-determined order. Some experiments also in-
cluded non-counterfactual baseline conditions, which were
conducted in a separate group, with all baseline participants
seeing every baseline condition in randomly-determined or-
der.
For the experiments that follow, we report mean human
judgments and predictions of each of the models we have
discussed. Both the ESM and the MNM have numeric pa-
rameters. The ESM’s predictions depend on a single param-
eter that specifies the stability of the exogenous variables.
The MNM has two parameters in total: one determining the
rate at which participants guess randomly, and a second that
captures the extent to which they incorporate probabilistic
information. For both models, we used a single parameter
or parameter vector that minimized the discrepancy between
model predictions and human responses across all experi-
ments, rather than fitting parameters on an experiment-by-
experiment basis. Best-fitting values of the parameters are
provided in Appendix C. To make the core ideas of the MNM
as clear as possible, the plots associated with each experi-
ment show the MNM’s predictions assuming that people do
not guess randomly. Following the results for our individual
experiments, we show overall model fits that are based on an
optimized guessing parameter for the MNM.
Experiment 1: Preserving real-world values
A common idea behind theories of counterfactual reason-
ing, including our own, is that people try to preserve the true
state of the world when reasoning about the consequences
of a counterfactual premise. For example, suppose that two
dice A and B are rolled and that both show the number 6.
Imagine now that die A had not showed a 6. Intuition sug-
gests that die B would probably still have showed a 6 in this
counterfactual scenario. More generally, if some fact is true
in the real world, that fact will probably remain true given
any counterfactual premise that is unrelated to the fact.
Our first experiment used the simplest possible causal
structure that allowed us to explore the preservation of real-
world values. As shown in Figure 5a, the structure includes
two variables that are not causally related to each other. Our
cover story described a lab that was conducting research on
hormones in mice, and described the variables as two hor-
mones that were present in a particular mouse. This framing
was designed to be compatible with a wide variety of dif-
ferent causal relationships between hormones, and to avoid
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Figure 5. Materials and results for Experiment 1. (a) Causal graphical model representing the scenario in Experiment 1. In
this system, hormones A and B are causally independent, so there is no edge between the nodes. The probability tables show
the prior probability that each hormone is present. (b) Summary of the hormones’ real-world states and their states in the two
counterfactual scenarios, where t (true) and f (false) denote the presence or absence of a particular hormone, and ‘?’ denotes
a hormone with an unknown counterfactual value. (c) Participants’ estimated probability judgments and model predictions.
Error bars represent standard errors of the means in this and all subsequent figures.
strong a priori intuitions, which participants might have had
about more commonplace scenarios. Figure 5b shows the
real-world states of the hormones, as well as the premises in
the two experimental conditions. In the observation condi-
tion, participants were asked whether B would be present if
they had observed A to be absent. In the intervention condi-
tion, participants were asked whether B would be present if
A had been absent as the result of an intervention.
According to the ESM people should be inclined to pre-
serve the true state of hormone B given a counterfactual
premise about hormone A, for both counterfactual interven-
tions and counterfactual observations. The ESM makes this
prediction because the exogenous variables in the counter-
factual world are often expected to take values that match
their real-world values. The model, however, also allows ex-
ogenous variables to differ across the real and counterfactual
worlds, which means that inferences about hormone B are
predicted to be below ceiling for both observations and inter-
ventions.
Several other outcomes are possible. For instance, the
USM proposes that participants ignore the true state of the
world when reasoning about counterfactual situations. The
model therefore predicts that participants will not preserve
the real-world state of hormone B when reasoning about
a counterfactual observation of A. Alternatively, partici-
pants might make a minimality assumption and consider only
counterfactual scenarios that differ in minimal respects from
the actual world. If so, then participants should match the
predictions of the SM and should preserve the true value of
variable B with very high confidence.
Methods
Participants. We recruited participants through the psy-
chology participant pool at Carnegie Mellon University and
online, through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. In-
lab participants were randomly assigned to one of two
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groups: a counterfactual group, with 55 participants who
saw all counterfactual conditions for Experiments 1 through
6; and a baseline group with 39 participants who saw non-
counterfactual versions of the conditions in Experiments 1,
2, and 6, for which non-counterfactual baseline data were
relevant. Of the online participants, 56 were recruited for the
counterfactual group, and 40 were recruited for the baseline
group.
Materials. The observation and intervention conditions
both used short stories along with a series of questions. The
stories for this experiment and all subsequent experiments
are reproduced in Appendix E. Both stories began with an in-
troduction that mentioned a mouse that was the subject of the
counterfactual questions, along with two hormones A and B,
which could be present or absent in a given mouse. For both
the observation and intervention conditions, the hormones A
and B were said to be present in “a very small number” of
mice. This verbal description was converted to the proba-
bilities in Figure 5a by asking participants how many out of
100 mice “a very small number” corresponds to at the end
of the study, and rounding the median (10) to the nearest
multiple of 5. The same procedure was used to map verbal
descriptions to probabilities in subsequent experiments. For
each hormone, participants read that its presence or absence
did not depend on the status of the other hormone, i.e., the
two hormones were causally independent. Participants also
read that both hormone A and hormone B were present in the
current mouse.
After the story, each condition included a set of questions
about each of the hormones that might be present in the cur-
rent mouse, presented in random order. In the observation
condition, participants were asked whether hormone B would
be present if they had observed hormone A to be absent in
that particular mouse. In the intervention condition, partici-
pants were asked whether hormone B would be absent if that
mouse had been raised on a special kibble that specifically
prevented the formation of hormone A. As a manipulation
check, participants were also asked if hormone A would be
absent if the mouse had been raised on special A-preventing
kibble.
Each question included a yes/no question about whether
the current hormone was present or not, followed by the
question “How confident are you in your answer?” Confi-
dence ratings were provided using a five-point scale where
1 was marked as “Not at all confident” and 5 was marked
“Completely confident”. We converted these ratings to sub-
jective probabilities by treating “Not at all confident” re-
sponses as probabilities of 0.5, and linearly interpolating be-
tween 0.5 and either 0 or 1, where the direction of interpola-
tion depended on the answer to the yes/no question. For ex-
ample, an answer of “no” and a confidence of 3 was mapped
to a subjective probability of 0.25, i.e., 0.5 minus 0.125 per
point less than “Completely confident.” An answer of “yes”
and a confidence of 3 was mapped to a subjective probability
of 0.75.
To understand how the counterfactual nature of our ques-
tions influenced people’s judgments, we ran two additional
conditions that did not involve counterfactuals but were oth-
erwise identical to the observation and intervention condi-
tions. In the observation-baseline condition, participants
were told “you observe A to be absent” rather than being
given non-counterfactual information followed by a coun-
terfactual premise about A. Similarly, in the intervention-
baseline condition, participants were simply told “you have
raised Frank [the mouse] on special kibble”, having been told
only that the special kibble specifically prevents hormone A
from being present.
Design and procedure. Every person in the counterfac-
tual group participated in both counterfactual conditions (ob-
servation and intervention) in random order, as part of the
larger set of experiments. Similarly, every person in the base-
line group participated in the corresponding baseline condi-
tions in random order, as part of the larger set of experiments.
Questions could not be skipped, and participants could not
return to a condition once they had submitted their answers.
Results and discussion
The counterfactual and baseline groups both received
questions with answers that were unambiguously determined
by the cover story, such as “If hormone A were present,
would hormone A be present?” or “If you had observed hor-
mone A to be present, would hormone A be present?” There
were 9 such questions in the counterfactual group and 5 in the
baseline group. We excluded participants who answered any
of those questions incorrectly, leaving 30 in-lab participants
in the counterfactual group and 30 in the baseline group. We
applied the same exclusion criterion to online participants,
leaving 34 remaining participants in the counterfactual group
and 23 participants in the baseline group. Preliminary analy-
ses revealed the same patterns of results across the two pop-
ulations, and we combine them in our results.4
Figure 5c shows model predictions and participant judg-
ments for both conditions. Mean human judgments for the
hormones A, B, and C are displayed in red and repeated
across rows, for comparison to the predictions of different
models. Using derived subjective probabilities, we found
that participants were more likely to say that hormone B was
present in the observation condition (M = .53, SD = .31)
than in the observation-baseline condition (Welch’s t-test;
M = .41, SD = .26; t(115.0) = 2.21, p = .029). Similarly,
participants were more likely to to say that hormone B was
present in the intervention condition (M = .72, SD = .31)
4Appendix C shows the accuracy of our model in predicting the
in-lab and online groups when those groups are considered sepa-
rately. Both accuracies are similar to the merged-group accuracy.
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than in the intervention-baseline condition (M = .46, SD =
.28; t(114.4) = 4.69, p < .001). These results indicate that
participants tended to preserve the real-world states of the
variables, as predicted by the ESM.
The remaining models in Figure 5 accounted less well for
the data. The SM predicts that hormone B will take its real-
world value in the counterfactual scenarios, leaving no room
for uncertainty — nothing but B’s exogenous causes influ-
ence the counterfactual B, and these exogenous causes are
unchanged in the counterfactual world. These stark predic-
tions differ from the graded responses that humans offer, but
a fairer evaluation of the SM might adopt the MNM’s idea
that participants are sometimes guessing randomly. We con-
sider such a modification in Appendix C, and find that it does
not greatly improve the overall performance of the SM even
when the guessing rate is optimized based on our data.
At the opposite extreme, the USM predicts that people do
not consider the real-world states of variables at all, and pre-
dicts that B will be counterfactually present in a very small
number of mice, contrary to what people report. Like the
SM, the MNM expects that people will expect hormone B to
take its real-world value in the counterfactual scenario. The
MNM, however, includes a parameter for the rate at which
people guess randomly. By setting this parameter close to
1.0, which captures the idea that people are almost always
guessing, the MNM can explain the current data. Experi-
ments 2 through 5, however, used similar but more complex
materials and yielded mean judgments that were far from
chance, which suggests that participants were not guessing
randomly in the current experiment.
Although our results are broadly consistent with the ESM,
one aspect of our data is not predicted by this model. Partic-
ipants tended to preserve the true values of hormone B more
strongly in the intervention condition than in the observation
condition (binomial sign test, p = .001). One possible expla-
nation is that some participants postulated a common hidden
cause that is responsible for the joint presence of A and B.
Given a hidden cause of this kind, the ESM predicts lower
judgments for the observation condition than the intervention
condition.
In summary, Experiment 1 suggests that people tend to
preserve real-word outcomes in counterfactual scenarios, but
do not do so universally or with high confidence. This result
is naturally captured by the ESM, but contrary to the predic-
tions of the SM and the USM.
Experiment 2: Observations and interventions
Experiment 1 focused on a very simple scenario for which
the ESM makes identical inferences about observation- and
intervention-based counterfactuals. We designed Experi-
ment 2 with the aims of confirming that people interpret
observational and interventional counterfactuals differently,
and establishing that the ESM (unlike the SM) makes pre-
dictions that align with human judgments in these cases.
The experiment used a chain of hormones with the same
causal structure as the system in our running bacon exam-
ple. As shown in Figure 6b, all hormones in the chain were
said to be present in the real world. In the observation con-
dition, participants were asked what values A and C would
have taken if they had observed B to be absent. The interven-
tion condition was similar, except the counterfactual premise
stated that B was absent as a result of an intervention.
All of the theories under consideration predict that C
would probably have been absent if B had been absent. The
theories, however, make different predictions about whether
and when people will backtrack and adjust the status of A
given the counterfactual premise involving B. As described
previously using our bacon example, the ESM predicts that
participants are more likely to backtrack in the observation
condition than the intervention condition. The MNM makes
the same prediction if extended as previously described to
distinguish between counterfactual observations and coun-
terfactual interventions. In contrast, the SM does not provide
a way to distinguish between counterfactual observations and
counterfactual interventions.
Our experiment is a conceptual replication of Sloman and
Lagnado’s (2005) Experiment 2. Sloman and Lagnado found
that counterfactual observations were more likely to produce
backtracking than counterfactual interventions, and we ex-
pected that our experiment would produce a similar result.
The question of primary interest is therefore the extent to
which the different models under consideration can account
for this result.
Methods
Participants. Experiment 2 included the same set of
participants as Experiment 1 and all other subsequent exper-
iments.
Materials. Experiment 2 included observation and in-
tervention conditions, consisting of stories and questions
with the same basic structure as those in Experiment 1,
but differing in the causal structures they described, the
real-world states of the hormones, and the counterfactual
premises as shown in Figure 6a-b. As in Experiment 1 and
the experiments that follow, the probabilities in Figure 6a
correspond to statements like “...in many of the mice...”,
where the numerical values were obtained by asking partic-
ipants how many out of 100 mice “many” corresponded to,
taking the median, and rounding to the nearest multiple of 5.
Both stories described a causal chain, shown in Figure 6a.
The stories stated that in many of the mice hormone A’s pres-
ence causes B to be present, and in many of the mice hor-
mone B’s presence causes C to be present. The stories also
stated that hormone A is absent is almost all of the mice,
that hormone A’s presence is the only cause of hormone B’s
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Figure 6. Materials and results for Experiment 2. (a) Causal graphical models representing the scenarios in Experiment 2,
where t and f denote the presence or absence of a particular hormone. (b) Summary of hormones’ real-world states and their
states in the two counterfactual scenarios (c) Participants’ estimated probability judgments and model predictions.
presence, and that hormone B’s presence is the only cause of
hormone C’s presence.
Participants in both conditions read that hormones A, B,
and C were all present in the mouse, but the counterfactual
premises varied by condition. In the observation condition,
participants were asked whether each of the hormones would
be present if they had observed hormone B to be absent in
the current mouse. In the intervention condition, participants
were asked whether hormones A and C would be present if
the current mouse had been raised on a special kibble that
specifically prevented the formation of hormone B.
As in Experiment 1, we compared our participants’ judg-
ments to judgments from non-counterfactual baseline con-
ditions, observation-baseline and intervention-baseline, that
were otherwise identical to the observation and intervention
conditions. In the observation-baseline condition, partici-
pants were told “you observe B to be absent” rather than
being given non-counterfactual information followed by a
counterfactual premise about B. In the intervention-baseline
condition, participants were simply told “you have raised
Nellie [the mouse] on special kibble”, having been told only
that the special kibble specifically prevents hormone B from
being present.
Design and procedure. The procedures for Experi-
ment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and all
other subsequent experiments.
Results and discussion
Mean responses and model predictions are shown in Fig-
ure 6c. The Bayes net in Figure 6a is not a functional causal
model, and the predictions of the SM and ESM are therefore
based on the corresponding functional model in Appendix B.
As predicted by the ESM, participants preserved the real-
world value of the counterfactual premise’s cause (hormone
A) more often in the intervention condition than the obser-
vation condition (binomial sign test, p < .001). In the inter-
vention condition, participants were more likely to preserve
the real-world value of hormone A than their counterparts
in the baseline condition (t(114.1) = 4.39, p < .001). For
the observation condition, there was no significant difference
(t(110.2) = .53, p = .60).
The ESM successfully predicts that people will make
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backtracking inferences when asked to reason about coun-
terfactual observations, but will do so more weakly when
the counterfactual premise is an intervention. In contrast,
the SM predicts an absence of backtracking — meaning that
A will be present — in both conditions, and the USM pre-
dicts backtracking in both conditions. The MNM distin-
guishes between the two kinds of counterfactuals by posit-
ing a new cause in the intervention case (Rips & Edwards,
2013), which makes any counterfactual change to the causes
of the premise non-minimal. As a result, the MNM predicts
no backtracking in the intervention case, but otherwise re-
quires that a break occurs to explain the counterfactual value
of B. Given that the available probabilistic information fa-
vors a break at A, the MNM predicts high levels of back-
tracking in the observation condition.
Experiment 2 provides evidence that people make back-
tracking inferences for both observational and interven-
tional counterfactuals, expanding on the results of Slo-
man and Lagnado’s (2005) Experiment 2. Whereas Slo-
man and Lagnado included non-causal control conditions,
we included baseline conditions that were causal but not
counterfactual, allowing us to focus narrowly on the ques-
tion of how counterfactual inferences differ from their non-
counterfactual counterparts.
Our baseline conditions also reveal that our data are in-
consistent with a tentative proposal offered by Meder, Hag-
mayer, and Waldmann (2009). Among other issues, these
authors explored whether people distinguish between coun-
terfactual interventions and hypothetical interventions such
as the intervention in our baseline condition. A critical dif-
ference between the two is that the state of the intervened-on
variable is known in the case of a counterfactual interven-
tion, but unknown in the case of a hypothetical intervention.
Meder et al. reported no significant differences between in-
ferences about counterfactual and hypothetical interventions,
and raised the possibility that people may fail in general to
distinguish between these kinds of interventions. This con-
clusion challenges both the SM and the ESM, which both
treat counterfactual interventions and hypothetical interven-
tions rather differently. Our data, however, suggest that peo-
ple can distinguish between counterfactual and hypothetical
interventions. As Meder et al. acknowledge, it is possible
that their null result reflects the complexity of their task,
which involved four variables and required participants to
infer conditional probabilities from a set of 50 to 60 training
events.
The most important finding from Experiment 2 is that
people treat counterfactual observations and counterfactual
interventions differently, which supports the fourth distinc-
tive feature of the Extended Structural Model in Table 1.
The specific pattern of results matches the predictions of the
ESM, which posits a trade-off between the prior probability
of a counterfactual world — as reflected in its consistency
with base rates and known causal relationships — and the
consistency of the counterfactual world with the real world.
We now turn to another characteristic in Table 1 that distin-
guishes the ESM and the SM from the other accounts in the
table. Both the ESM and the SM propose that people rep-
resent apparently stochastic causal relationships in terms of
hidden exogenous variables, and that people prefer counter-
factual scenarios in which those hidden variables take their
real-world states.
Experiment 3: Stochastic versus deterministic
relationships
A central tenet of the SM and the ESM is that any given
causal relationship is deterministic at some level, and that
people represent apparently stochastic relationships in terms
of hidden, exogenous mediators. For example, people may
explain the relationship between cooking bacon and alarm
activation by invoking a mediating variable such as the di-
rection of air currents. If people automatically reason in
this way, then their inferences should be the same regard-
less of whether or not the mediating variable is explicitly
described. Our third experiment tests this prediction and
explores whether inferences about an apparently stochastic
model are similar to inferences about a corresponding func-
tional causal model.
Experiment 3 asked people to reason about two structures
shown in Figure 7a. The first structure specifies a stochas-
tic relationship between hormones A and C, and the second
specifies a deterministic relationship mediated by an addi-
tional hormone B. The base rate of B has been chosen so
that the two structures capture the same probability distribu-
tion P(C|A). The ESM and the SM predict that the stochas-
tic structure is represented in a way that is equivalent to the
deterministic structure, and therefore predicts that the two
structures will lead to similar patterns of inference. In con-
trast, the MNM predicts that the two structures will be treated
differently.
Methods
Participants. Experiment 3 included the same set of
participants as Experiment 1 and all other subsequent exper-
iments.
Materials. Participants saw stochastic and deterministic
conditions, consisting of stories and questions with the same
basic structure as those in Experiment 2, but differing in the
causal structures they described, the real-world states of the
hormones, and the counterfactual premises.
The two stories describe causal systems in which hormone
A causes the presence or absence of hormone C, as shown
in Figure 7a. In the stochastic condition, participants read
that in a very small number of mice, hormone A’s presence
causes hormone C to be absent, and hormone A’s absence
causes hormone C to be present, while in the remaining mice
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Figure 7. Materials and results for Experiment 3. (a) Causal graphical models representing the scenarios in Experiment 3,
where t and f denote the presence or absence of a particular hormone. The arcs between the arrows in the deterministic
condition signify that the relationship between A, B, and C is not simply generative or preventative, but instead B flips the re-
lationship between A and C from generative to preventative. Dashed edges indicate probabilistic relationships, and solid edges
indicate deterministic relationships. (b) Summary of hormones’ real-world states and their states in the two counterfactual
scenarios. (c) Participants’ estimated probability judgments and model predictions.
the presence of hormone A causes hormone C to be present
and the absence of hormone A causes hormone C to be ab-
sent. In the materials given to participants and included in
Appendix E, the effect variable in the stochastic condition
was called B rather than C, but this variable has been rela-
beled in Figure 7a to emphasize that it plays the same role as
the variable C in the deterministic condition. In the determin-
istic condition, the underlying relationship between A and C
was similar, but now explicitly dependent upon a hormone
B which was said to be present in a very small number of
mice. If B is present then C is present in the absence of A and
vice versa, and if B is absent then hormone C’s state matches
that of hormone A. The conditional probability table for the
deterministic condition in Figure 7a reflects this relationship:
if B is present, C will be present only if A is absent, and if B
is absent, C will be present only if A is present.
Figure 7b shows the real world states of the hormones
along with the counterfactual premises. Participants in both
conditions read that hormone A was present and hormone C
was absent in the mouse, and read in the deterministic condi-
tion that hormone B was present. All participants were asked
whether each of the hormones that had been identified would
be present if hormone A were absent. Unlike Experiments 1
and 2, which used counterfactual observations and counter-
factual interventions, Experiment 3 used a generic counter-
factual premise which asked participants to think about “If
A had been absent...’ For the purpose of generating model
predictions, we assume that generic premises of this kind are
interpreted as counterfactual observations. The general dis-
cussion, however, considers some of the ways in which the
interpretation of generic counterfactuals may be shaped by
context.
Design and procedure. The procedures for Experi-
ment 3 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and all
other subsequent experiments.
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Results and discussion
Mean responses and model predictions are shown in Fig-
ure 7c. The results of primary interest are the inferences
about variable C in both conditions. The ESM and SM make
identical inferences in both conditions because they represent
the stochastic structure in a way that is identical to the deter-
ministic structure. According to the SM, C should reliably be
present when A is counterfactually absent, because the value
of the mediating variable B is preserved in the counterfactual
world. The ESM predicts that there should be an intermedi-
ate level of confidence that C is present in the absence of A,
because there is a tension between preserving the true value
of the mediator and choosing a counterfactual world that is
likely.
The MNM does not represent the stochastic structure in a
way that matches the deterministic structure, and as a result
makes different inferences about variable C in the two con-
ditions. In the stochastic condition, the model relies on base
rates and predicts that C is absent when A is counterfactually
absent regardless of the real-world values of A and C. In the
deterministic condition, the model infers that B is present in
the real world, and carries the value of B over to the counter-
factual world, which implies that C will be present.
The human responses in Figure 7c are more consistent
with the ESM than the other models under consideration.
Consistent with the ESM’s predictions, and contrary to those
of the MNM, there was no significant difference between
judgments about hormone C in the two conditions (binomial
sign test, p = .36). The average subjective probabilities that
hormone C was present in the counterfactual world were .59
and .67 for the stochastic and deterministic conditions, re-
spectively. The similar judgments for hormone C across the
two conditions indicates that participants treated both condi-
tions as involving a hidden mediator, rather than interpreting
the stochastic condition as involving inherently stochastic re-
lationships.
Although the ESM successfully predicts that inferences
about C will be similar across the two conditions, none of
the models explains why participants gave higher judgments
for C than B in the deterministic condition (binomial sign
test, p < .001). One might expect that inferences about B
would be similar to inferences about variable B in Experi-
ment 1, and it is therefore somewhat surprising that the mean
judgment for B falls below 0.5 in the deterministic condition.
The results for variable B may therefore indicate that a small
number of participants found the causal relationships in the
deterministic condition difficult to understand.
The ESM does not account for all aspects of our data,
but Experiments 1 through 3 nevertheless support four ba-
sic commitments of the model that are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. First, people appear willing to consider counterfac-
tual scenarios that are more than minimally different from
the actual world. Second, people’s judgments about appar-
ently stochastic relationships are consistent with inferences
to hidden exogenous variables. Third, people reliably make
backtracking inferences in some situations. Fourth, people
interpret counterfactual observations and counterfactual in-
terventions differently.
The results of our first three experiments raise some chal-
lenges for the Minimal Networks Model, but none of these
challenges is conclusive. In particular, the MNM accounts
fairly well for these experiments if its guessing parameter
is set to a very high value. We now turn to a more direct
comparison between the ESM and the MNM. The core as-
sumption of the MNM is that people consider only minimal
alterations of the real world, and Experiments 4 and 5 ex-
plore whether people’s counterfactual inferences are consis-
tent with this assumption. These experiments will allow us
to distinguish between the ESM and the MNM regardless of
whether the MNM’s guessing parameter is small or large.
Experiment 4: Base rates and non-minimal breaks
We introduced the MNM using the example in Figure 4,
in which cooking bacon and burning toast can both cause the
alarm to sound. In reality, bacon was not cooked, toast was
not burned, and the alarm did not sound. Suppose, however,
that the alarm had sounded. According to the CPD for the
alarm variable, the sounding of the alarm is possible only in
worlds where either bacon was cooked, or toast was burned,
or both. As shown in Figure 4, the MNM allows only min-
imal departures from the real world, and focuses on the two
counterfactual worlds in which only one possible cause is
present. The world in which bacon was cooked and toast was
burned is non-minimal, because just one of these departures
from the real world would be enough to explain the coun-
terfactual premise (i.e. that the alarm sounded). Intuitively,
however, if bacon-cooking and toast-burning are both com-
mon, it seems plausible that both might have occurred in the
counterfactual world.
Experiments 4 and 5 use variants of the example just
described to explore whether people consider non-minimal
counterfactual worlds. Experiment 4 aims to distinguish be-
tween the ESM and the MNM by pitting the MNM’s con-
cept of minimality against probabilistic information. The
causal structure indicates that hormones A and B can each
separately cause hormone C to be present, (Figure 8a), and
in the real world, hormones A, B and C are all absent in a
particular mouse. If hormone C were present, what would
be true of hormones A and B? Absent any additional infor-
mation, both the ESM and the MNM predict that either A or
B will be present, but probably not both. These models di-
verge, however, if A and B are almost always present in other
mice. The MNM continues to predict that at most one suf-
ficient cause will be present, because non-minimal states are
excluded from consideration. In contrast, the ESM balances
the preservation of real-world values against the probability
18 CHRISTOPHER G. LUCAS
of different configurations, and predicts that hormones A and
B are both more likely to be present than absent.
Methods
Participants. Experiment 4 included the same set of
participants as Experiment 1 and all other subsequent exper-
iments.
Materials. Experiment 4’s materials consisted of one
story with the same basic structure as those in Experiment
3, but differing in the causal structure it described, the real-
world states of the hormones, and the counterfactual premise.
The story described a causal system in which hormones A
and B cause the presence or absence of hormone C, which in
turn causes D, as shown in Figure 8a. Participants read that
hormone A’s presence causes hormone C to be present in all
mice, hormone B’s presence causes hormone C to be present
in all mice, C’s presence causes hormone D to be present in
all mice, and that hormones A and B are present in almost all
mice. Participants read that all four hormones were absent in
the current mouse, and were asked whether each of the hor-
mones that had been identified would be present if hormone
C were present.
We suspected that asking questions about the causes but
not the effects of the counterfactual premise might make par-
ticipants more prone to backtracking inferences, an issue we
address in the general discussion. To mitigate this concern,
we included an additional hormone D, which was an effect
of C, and asked about it as well.
Design and procedure. The procedures for Experi-
ment 4 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and all
other subsequent experiments.
Results and discussion
Figure 8c shows that participants reported that A and B
would be present more often than not, for both A (t(63) =
4.90, p < .001) and B (t(63) = 5.60, p < .001). These re-
sults are consistent with the predictions of the ESM, which
takes into account the high base rates of hormones A and B
and permits both to be present in the counterfactual world. In
contrast, the MNM only permits one of the two hormones to
be present — changing both would be non-minimal — and
thus predicts that A and B each have a .5 probability of being
present.
Figure 8c also shows that the SM and the USM both fail to
account for participants’ inferences. The SM predicts that A
and B will both take their real-world values, while the USM
ignores the true state of the world and, unlike humans, simply
matches A′ and B′ to their base rates.
The main conclusion from Experiment 4 is that probabilis-
tic information can influence people’s inferences about back-
tracking counterfactuals, even when minimality suggests that
this information should be ignored. In this first contrast be-
tween the MNM and the ESM, we used a simple, symmetric
causal scenario, and elicited a robust but relatively subtle ef-
fect. The next experiment uses a slightly more complex sce-
nario, which allows us to explore a case in which the ESM
and the Minimal Networks Model make starkly different pre-
dictions.
Experiment 5: Stochastic relationships and non-minimal
breaks
Experiment 5 adapted the structure used in Experiment 4
as shown in Figure 9. As before, hormone A is a determin-
istic cause of C, but now hormone B is a stochastic cause —
its presence almost always causes C to be present. In the real
world, hormones A, B and C are all observed to be present.
Consider now a counterfactual premise that states that C is
absent. Under the MNM, the deterministic cause A must be
absent in order to explain the counterfactual premise, and the
noisy cause B must be present, as its absence would con-
stitute a non-minimal break. In contrast, the ESM predicts
that both causes are likely to be absent, because C’s absence
would be highly unlikely even in the presence of B alone.
Methods
Participants. Experiment 5 included the same set of
participants as Experiment 1 and all other subsequent exper-
iments.
Materials. Experiment 5’s materials consisted of one
story with the same basic structure as that in Experiment 4.
The story described a causal system in which hormones A
and B cause the presence or absence of hormone C, which
in turn causes D, as shown in Figure 9a. Participants read
that hormone A’s presence causes hormone C to be present
in all mice, hormone B’s presence causes hormone C to be
present in almost all mice, and C’s presence causes hormone
D to be present in all mice. Participants read that all four
hormones were present in the current mouse, and were asked
whether each of the hormones that had been identified would
be present if hormone C were absent.
Design and procedure. The procedures for Experi-
ment 5 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and all
other subsequent experiments.
Results and discussion
Model predictions and human responses are shown in Fig-
ure 9c. The MNM and the ESM both predict that A must be
absent, because C cannot be absent in the presence of A. For
hormone B, however, the models make very different predic-
tions. The MNM predicts that B must be present, because
changing B from its real-world value constitutes a superflu-
ous change from the real world — a non-minimal break. The
ESM predicts that B is relatively unlikely to be present, be-
cause it permits B to differ from its real-world value and it
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Figure 8. Materials and results for Experiment 4. (a) Causal graphical models representing the scenarios in Experiment 4,
where t and f denote the presence or absence of a particular hormone. (b) Summary of hormones’ real-world states and their
states in the counterfactual scenario. (c) Participants’ estimated probability judgments and model predictions.
is implausible, although possible, that C is absent when B is
present.
We cannot evaluate the models by comparing average sub-
jective probabilities for A and B to zero and one respectively,
because variability in individuals’ confidences could lead us
to falsely conclude that the MNM’s predictions are inaccu-
rate. We can, however, compare judgments for hormones
A and B to distinguish between the two models: the ESM
predicts that judgments about B should be further from 1.0
than judgments of A are from zero. In contrast, the MNM
predicts that A judgments should deviate from the floor at
the same rate that B judgments deviate from ceiling, because
any such deviations are due to cases where participants guess
randomly.
Consistent with the ESM’s predictions, participants’ judg-
ments for B were significantly further from ceiling than A
judgments were from floor, as revealed by a hypothesis test
comparing the sum of the two judgments to 1.0 (t(63.0) =
4.57, p < .001). This result indicates that people are willing
to consider counterfactual worlds that are more than mini-
mally different from the real world, especially when there is
reason to believe that such counterfactual worlds are proba-
ble.
One notable difference between the predictions of all
models and our participants’ judgments is that participants
did not confidently predict that hormone D, the effect of the
counterfactual premise, would be absent. One possible ex-
planation is that the cover story did not exclude the possibil-
ity that hormone D had other causes — if participants expect
that an additional, unobserved cause of D may be present,
then all of the models assign a non-zero probability that D
will be present in both of the counterfactual scenarios.
Taken together, the results of Experiments 4 and 5 indicate
that the ESM gives a better account of counterfactual infer-
ences than the Minimal Networks Model. Combining these
results with the results of Experiments 1 through 3 suggests
that the ESM performs better than the three other models
represented in Table 1—the SM, the USM, and the MNM.
It remains possible, however, that some combination of these
models might account for people’s inferences. For example,
perhaps individuals have access to multiple strategies for rea-
soning about counterfactual scenarios, and apply the SM in
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Figure 9. Materials and results for Experiment 5. (a) Causal graphical models representing the scenarios in Experiment 5,
where t and f denote the presence or absence of a particular hormone. (b) Summary of hormones’ real-world states and their
states in the counterfactual scenario. (c) Participants’ estimated probability judgments and model predictions.
some contexts and the USM model in others. Our final ex-
periment focuses on a scenario that distinguishes the ESM
from any mixed strategy that relies on combinations of the
SM, the USM, and the MNM.
Experiment 6: ESM versus mixed strategies
As described earlier, the SM and the USM are special
cases of the ESM, and it is therefore natural to ask whether
the ESM is empirically distinguishable from a weighted
combination of the SM and the USM. From a psychologi-
cal perspective, there are multiple ways in which the SM and
the USM could be combined. One possibility is that each
person consistently makes inferences consistent with one of
the models, given that we have been looking at judgments
averaged across individuals. Another possibility is that peo-
ple might occasionally ignore the counterfactual nature of a
scenario or query, and make judgments consistent with the
USM. A third possibility is that a single individual might be
uncertain about how to interpret a counterfactual query, and
might therefore make a single judgment that averages over
different models. In all of these cases, mean judgments over
a sample will reflect a weighted average of the predictions of
the SM and the USM.
The causal chain in Figure 10a allows us to distinguish
between the ESM and weighted combinations of the SM,
the USM and the MNM. In almost all mice, the value of B
matches the value of A—in other words, the presence of A
causes B to be present, and the absence of A causes B to be
absent. In the remaining mice, the value of B is the opposite
of the value of A. The relationship between B and C is sim-
ilar: in almost all mice, the value of C matches the value of
B, but in the remaining mice, the value of C is the opposite
of the value of B.
In the real world, A and B are known to be absent and C
is known to be present. This information suggests that the
mouse in question is a mouse for which B matches A. Given
the counterfactual premise that B is present, the ESM is in-
clined to preserve the fact that A matches B, and therefore
predicts that A is probably present. The real-world values
also suggest that the mouse is one of the unusual cases in
which C does not match B. The ESM infers that C may con-
tinue to be different from B in the counterfactual world, and
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Figure 10. Materials and results for Experiment 6. (a) Causal graphical models representing the scenarios in Experiment 6,
where t and f denote the presence or absence of a particular hormone. (b) Summary of hormones’ real-world states and their
states in the counterfactual scenario. (c) Participants’ estimated probability judgments and model predictions.
therefore predicts that C is less likely to be present than A.
None of the remaining models generates higher predic-
tions for A than for C. The SM predicts that A and C should
both be absent. The prediction about A follows from treating
the counterfactual premise as an intervention on B, which
implies that A’s value in the counterfactual world will match
its real-world value. The prediction about C follows from
the inference that the mouse of interest is an unusual case in
which C is different from B.
The USM and the MNM predict that C is more likely to be
present than A. The USM makes this inference because the
base rates of the three hormones increase along the chain—
in particular, B and C are more likely a priori to be present
than A. The MNM yields the same qualitative prediction as
the USM, because all possible counterfactual worlds involve
minimal breaks with respect to the real world.
Given these separate predictions, any weighted combina-
tion of the MNM, the SM, and the USM predicts that hor-
mone C is at least as likely to be present as hormone A. Ex-
periment 6 is therefore a strong test of the ESM’s prediction
that C is less likely to be present than A.
Methods
Participants. Experiment 6 included the same set of
participants as Experiment 1 and all other subsequent exper-
iments.
Materials. Experiment 6’s materials consisted of one
story with the same basic structure as that in Experiment
2, but differing in the causal structure it described, the real-
world states of the hormones, and the counterfactual premise.
Experiment 6 involved a slightly more detailed causal system
than other experiments and may have seemed more complex
to participants, so we included a non-counterfactual baseline
condition — parallel to that used for Experiments 1 and 2 —
to determine whether participants’ non-counterfactual infer-
ences were consistent with the probabilities and causal rela-
tionships described in the story.
The story described a causal system in which the state of
hormone A causes the presence or absence of hormone B,
which in turn causes the presence or absence of hormone C.
Participants read that in almost all mice, if A is present, this
causes B to be present, and if A is absent, this causes B to be
absent. In the remaining mice, if A is present, this causes B
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to be absent, and if A is absent, this causes B to be present.
The same relationship was described between B and C. In
almost all mice, if B is present, this causes C to be present,
and if B is absent, this causes C to be absent. In the remaining
mice, if B is present, this causes C to be absent, and if B is
absent, this causes C to be present.
Participants read that hormones A and B were present in
the current mouse but C was absent, and were asked whether
each of the hormones that had been identified would be
present if hormone B were observed to be present.
Design and procedure. The procedures for Experi-
ment 6 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and all
other subsequent experiments.
Results and discussion
Our results in the baseline condition, shown in Ap-
pendix D, indicate that participants understood the proba-
bilities and causal relationships described in the cover story.
Average responses to the counterfactual questions are shown
in Figure 10c. Consistent with the ESM, people infer that
hormone A is more likely to be present than hormone C (bi-
nomial sign test p = .0039). As described earlier, this result
is inconsistent with any weighted combination of the SM,
the USM, and the MNM. We can therefore conclude that
the ESM provides a better account of people’s counterfactual
inferences than any mixed strategy involving the alternative
models considered in this paper.
Overall model comparison
Previous sections described six individual experiments,
and we now compare the overall performance of the models
that we have considered. Figure 11 provides a quantitative
summary of the performance of each model for each exper-
iment. The measure used is sum squared error, and lower
error rates indicate better performance. The mixture model
plotted is a weighted combination of the ESM and the USM
that relies on a single free parameter to specify the relative
weights of the two models.
Figure 11 shows that the ESM had the lowest prediction
errors for Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6. In Experiments 2 and
5, the ESM yielded marginally higher prediction errors than
the MNM and the mixture model, respectively. Overall, how-
ever, the ESM made the most accurate predictions across the
six experiments.
We can also compare model performance by looking at
the correlation between model predictions and mean human
judgments. For the purpose of this comparison, we ex-
cluded all manipulation-check items, because responses to
these items are not revealing about the differences between
models. Figure 12 shows that the ESM’s predictions corre-
spond closely to human judgments, and produce the highest
correlation with human judgments.
As mentioned previously, we fit each model by selecting a
single parameter or parameter vector that minimizes its sum
squared error across all judgments. The SM and the USM
have no free parameters, the ESM and the mixture model
include one free parameter each, and the MNM includes two
free parameters. It is important to ask whether the perfor-
mance of the ESM is highly sensitive to the values of its sta-
bility parameter. We addressed this question by examining
fits of the ESM to human judgments as a function of the sta-
bility parameter. For comparison, we also plotted the sensi-
tivity of the mixture model (the second most accurate model)
to the weight it assigns to the USM versus the SM. The gray
region in Figure 13 shows the stability values for which the
ESM yields better fits than the best performance achieved by
any other model. The performance of the ESM is moderately
sensitive to stability and decreases smoothly both above and
below the optimum of 0.53. We also estimated prediction er-
ror for each model using cross-validation, which reduces the
risk of over-fitting and provides a more accurate assessment
of a model’s performance. The results of this analysis are
reported in Appendix C, and show similar sum squared error
for the ESM (0.29 versus 0.28).
The SM performs substantially worse than the other mod-
els overall, and one possible reason is that the SM model
does not allow for random guessing and other kinds of noisy
responses. The MNM has a parameter than explicitly pro-
vides for guessing, and the ESM is tolerant of noise because
it naturally favors less-extreme probabilities than the SM.
To compare the models on more equal terms, we evaluated
a version of the SM that fitted a guessing parameter analo-
gous to the one used in the MNM. The results are reported
in Appendix C, which shows that the SM with guessing has
much smaller errors than the original version, but that these
errors are still more than twice the corresponding errors for
the ESM and the MNM.
Individual-level model fits
It is possible for a model to account for mean judg-
ments while failing to capture the behavior of individu-
als. To explore whether the ESM accounts for the infer-
ences of individuals, we analyzed the correspondence be-
tween each model’s predictions and individual judgments,
using the same model parameters as before. Figure 14 shows
the number of individuals whose judgments across all exper-
iments are best matched by each model. More than half of
all participants’ judgments were best predicted by the ESM,
with the remaining participants distributed among the alter-
native models. We can therefore conclude that the predictive
accuracy of the ESM is not an artifact of averaging over in-
dividuals.
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Figure 11. Errors of different models on a per-experiment basis, as measured by sum squared error of predictions versus
average judgments. The mixture model is a weighted combination of the USM and the SM.
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Figure 12. Model predictions plotted against mean human judgments, across all experiments and questions, excluding
manipulation-check questions about the counterfactual premises themselves.
Model fits to previous data
We have seen that the accuracy of the ESM is not an arti-
fact of averaging over individuals, but how sensitive is it to
the stimuli that we used? We can address this question by
looking at how well the ESM predicts human judgments in
past studies. Rips (2010) conducted four experiments that
are well-suited to this purpose. These experiments were in-
tended to evaluate the Minimal Networks Model and used
a cover story in which the variables were the states (operat-
ing or not) of different components in a machine. In Rips’s
Experiment 1, components A and B caused component C to
operate either “usually” or “always”, and were either jointly
necessary or individually sufficient to produce C’s operation,
for four conditions in all. Experiment 2 looked at effects of
question wording—in particular, at the difference between
phrases like “if Component C were not operating?” and “if
Component C had not operated?” Neither the ESM nor the
MNM distinguishes between these alternative wordings. Ex-
periment 3 compared high (.95) and low (.05) base rates for
the operation of components A and B, which were left un-
stated in Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 4 explored both
forward and backtracking counterfactual inferences when A
caused B and C, B caused C, and the counterfactual premise
focused on B.
In generating predictions for these studies, we took “usu-
ally” to indicate a probability of 0.8, and “always” to indi-
cate a probability of 1.0. When base rates were unstated, we
assumed that they were 0.5. We compared the ESM to the
MNM by finding the parameter values for both models that
maximized correlations between the models and mean hu-
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man judgments from Rips’s Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4. Full
details of the analysis are provided in Appendix C. Figure 15
suggests that the ESM accounts for Rips’ data as well as his
own Minimal Networks Model (r = .86 for the ESM, versus
r = .85 for MNM). The two models perform similarly even
though the ESM has one free parameter and the MNM has
two.
Taken together, our analyses suggest that the ESM pre-
dicts both aggregate and individual-level performance across
a variety of counterfactual scenarios. The model performs
better than all alternatives that we have considered, including
the SM, the MNM, and the mixture model. In addition to the
quantitative results that we have presented, our experiments
provide qualitative support for all four of the key commit-
ments of the ESM that are highlighted in Table 1. In par-
ticular, our data suggest that people are willing to consider
counterfactual scenarios beyond those that depart in minimal
respects from the actual world, that they tend to assume that
apparently stochastic relationships are mediated by hidden
variables, that they distinguish between counterfactual ob-
servations and interventions, and that they readily backtrack
when reasoning about counterfactual scenarios.
General discussion
We presented a formal model of counterfactual reasoning
and evaluated it in six experiments. Experiments 1 through
3 provided support for the core commitments of the ESM.
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that people are moder-
ately inclined to preserve real-world states of variables when
reasoning about counterfactual scenarios. In addition, Exper-
iment 2 showed that people distinguish between counterfac-
tual observations and counterfactual interventions. Experi-
ment 3 demonstrated that people appear to think of stochas-
tic relationships as being mediated by hidden variables, and
make inferences consistent with preserving those variables’
states.
Experiments 4 through 6 were specifically designed to
contrast the ESM with alternative accounts of counterfactual
reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 focused on the Minimal Net-
works Model, and suggested that people rely on probabilistic
information in a way that is consistent with the ESM but in-
consistent with the Minimal Networks Model. Experiment
6 focused on a case in which the ESM accounts for human
inferences better than any weighted combination of the other
models considered in this paper.
Having demonstrated that the ESM predicts human per-
formance in a variety of counterfactual scenarios, we now
address some of the general questions that are raised by our
approach.
Stability and mutability
The ESM relies on the notion of stability to capture how
closely a counterfactual world should be coupled to the real
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Figure 15. Model predictions for the ESM and MNM, plotted against mean human judgments from Rips (2010).
world. The stability parameter s in Equation 1 can be in-
terpreted in at least two ways. At a process level, s can be
viewed as a parameter that influences how a representation
of a counterfactual world is constructed. Each exogenous
variable in the counterfactual world can be set in two ways:
the value of the variable can be copied over from the real
world, or the value can be sampled from the prior distribution
for this variable. The stability parameter can be thought of as
the probability that the value of any given exogenous variable
will be copied from the real world rather than sampled from
the prior.
Although operationalizing stability at a process level may
be sufficient for some purposes, one might also ask why rea-
soners use the process just described to construct their repre-
sentation of a counterfactual world. As suggested earlier, the
ESM is consistent with the view that a branching process op-
erates through time to create a multiverse of possible worlds.
Appendix A describes how the stability parameter can be for-
malized as a decreasing function of the time that has elapsed
since the counterfactual world separated from the real world.
The derivation in Appendix A should be viewed as just
one way in which the stability parameter can be understood
and in which Equation 1 can be justified. Alternate or ex-
panded derivations will be needed to account for all of the
contexts in which counterfactual statements can be evalu-
ated. For example, the derivation in Appendix A applies
most naturally to counterfactuals involving premises that re-
fer to particular times. Some counterfactuals, however, do
not fit this pattern, including the claim that “if kangaroos
had no tails, they would topple over” (Lewis, 1979). The
premise of this counterfactual does not refer to a particular
time, which means that any derivation involving a temporal
branching process seems unlikely to apply to this example.
Our notion of stability is closely related to the notion of
mutability that plays a prominent role in previous work on
counterfactual reasoning (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; De-
hghani et al., 2012). Mutability and stability can be viewed
as opposites: for example, an exogenous variable is mutable
if it is likely to vary across real and counterfactual worlds,
and stable if it is likely to take identical values across these
worlds. Previous studies have identified multiple factors that
influence mutability. For example, Kahneman and Miller
suggest that exceptional events are more mutable than rou-
tine events, that events about which little is known are rel-
atively mutable, that effects are more mutable than causes,
and that the second member of an ordered pair of events is
more mutable than the first (see also Segura et al., 2002).
Girotto, Legrenzi and Rizzo (1991) report that controllable
events (e.g. voluntary choices) are more mutable than uncon-
trollable events (e.g. an asthma attack). Expanding on this
result, Mandel and Lehman (1996) suggest that controllable
events that prevent a focal outcome are more mutable than
controllable events that generate the same outcome.
Mutability is typically described as a property of individ-
ual variables, and our notion of stability is also naturally in-
terpreted in this way. As described earlier, our evaluation
of the ESM made the simplifying assumption that the stabil-
ity parameters associated with all exogenous variables were
identical. We made this assumption because our experiments
focused on simple scenarios in which all variables were of
the same type (all represented the presence or absence of hor-
mones) and in which factors such as controllability played
little role. It is straightforward, however, to associate differ-
ent exogenous variables with different values of the stability
parameter s in Equation 1. Making this change allows the
ESM to incorporate many of the findings that have emerged
from previous studies of mutability. For example, exoge-
nous variables associated with uncontrollable events can be
assigned lower stability parameters than exogenous variables
associated with controllable events.
Setting stability parameters on the basis of prior research
provides one way to connect our work with previous studies
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of mutability, but does not itself explain the findings of these
studies. It seems likely, however, that our formal framework
can help to account for at least two findings from the litera-
ture on mutability. First, the ESM balances the prior proba-
bility of a counterfactual world against consistency with the
actual world, and incorporating prior probability may help
to explain why exceptional events are more mutable than
routine events. Second, Appendix A formalizes stability in
a way that relies on a temporal branching process, and it
seems likely that this approach can be adjusted to capture
the idea that recently-occurring events are more mutable than
events that occurred in the distant past. We suspect, however,
that many other factors that affect mutability are unlikely
to emerge from our framework. For example, explaining
why controllable events are more mutable than uncontrol-
lable events seems to require ideas that go beyond the scope
of the ESM.
Interpreting counterfactual premises
One of the features of the ESM highlighted in Table 1 is
that it distinguishes between counterfactual observations and
counterfactual interventions. Counterfactual claims, how-
ever, are often expressed using generic statements such as
“If A had been absent” which do not indicate whether the
absence of A should be treated as an observation or as the
result of an intervention. All of our analyses assumed that
generic counterfactual premises should be interpreted as ob-
servations, and this assumption is supported by our finding
that generic counterfactuals typically led to backtracking.
In general, however, the interpretation of a counterfactual
premise may be influenced by various contextual factors.
Rips and Edwards (2013) demonstrated that relatively
subtle variations in the wording of a counterfactual premise
can affect the way in which it is interpreted. In their first ex-
periment they asked participants to reason about devices with
multiple components, and used two kinds of counterfactual
premises. Some participants were asked questions such as “If
component B had not operated, would component A have op-
erated?”, and others were asked questions such as “If compo-
nent B had failed, would component B have operated?” Their
data suggested that the not operated wording led participants
to treat the premise as a counterfactual observation, and that
the failed wording led participants to treat the premise as a
counterfactual intervention. Explaining effects of this kind
seems to require a careful account of the semantics of the
verbs in question.
Pragmatic factors may also shape the interpretation of
counterfactual premises. People tend to expect that state-
ments will be informative and relevant, and may therefore
reject interpretations under which the counterfactual premise
carries little or no information about the answer to the query.
For example, suppose that A’s presence causes B to be
present, which in turn causes C to be present, and that in
reality all three variables are present. A participant is asked
“If B had been absent, would A have been present or absent?”
Interpreting the premise as a counterfactual intervention may
violate pragmatic expectations because a premise of this sort
provides no information about the value of A. The interven-
tional interpretation, however, appears more natural if the
question about A follows a question about C. In this case,
the inference that interventions on B provide no informa-
tion about A seems more acceptable because it contrasts with
the inference that interventions on B do provide information
about C. This pragmatic account is supported by experiments
which demonstrate that people’s tendency to backtrack de-
pends on whether backtracking questions are asked before or
after non-backtracking questions (Gerstenberg, Bechlivani-
dis, & Lagnado, 2013).
Applications of counterfactual reasoning
A successful account of counterfactual reasoning should
provide a foundation for understanding the role that counter-
factual thinking plays in everyday life. This section describes
two ways in which the ESM may serve as a useful starting
point for studying applications of counterfactual reasoning.
Counterfactuals are useful in part because they provide a
guide to action. For example, a student who fails an exam
might be interested in actions that she can take to avoid fail-
ing future exams. One way to identify these actions is to
imagine a counterfactual world in which the student passed
the exam, and to reason about the causes that might have
generated this positive outcome. For example, the student
might think “in order to pass, I’d have needed to study twice
as hard as I did.” An inference of this kind seems closely
related to a backtracking counterfactual that proceeds from a
desired effect (e.g. passing the exam) to a cause (e.g. study-
ing hard). Philosophers sometimes suggest that backtracking
counterfactuals are invalid or treat them as anomalous spe-
cial cases (Downing, 1959; Lewis, 1973a; Bennett, 1974),
but these counterfactuals may be relatively common when
planning future actions. Unlike the SM, the ESM supports
backtracking, and therefore seems well-suited for capturing
the role that counterfactuals play in action selection.
Assigning credit and blame is a second task that often
draws on counterfactual reasoning. For example, a student
who fails an exam is likely to blame herself for this outcome
if she thinks that she would have needed to study more in
order to pass. A different student might think that “I would
have passed if the test had been easier,” and might be in-
clined to blame her failure on the difficulty of the exam. As
these examples suggest, credit and blame assignment depend
critically on the mutability of different variables (Miller &
Gunasegaram, 1990; Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis,
2008)—for example, whether the preparation of the student
or the difficulty of the exam is the more mutable factor. As
suggested earlier, the prior distributions used by the ESM can
COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING 27
capture some of the ways in which norms influence mutabil-
ity (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). For example, suppose that
the student normally prepares well for exams, and that these
exams are normally difficult. Given prior distributions that
capture these expectations, the ESM predicts that the student
who failed is likely to blame herself for this outcome, be-
cause the counterfactual premise “I passed the exam” pro-
vides more support for the conclusion “I prepared well” than
for the conclusion “the exam was easy.” As mentioned ear-
lier, factors including temporal sequence and the controlla-
bility of different events can also influence mutability judg-
ments. Allowing different exogenous variables to take dif-
ferent values of the stability parameter may allow the ESM
to capture more of the ways in which mutability influences
credit and blame assignment.
Levels of analysis
The psychological literature includes contributions at
multiple levels of analysis (Marr, 1982), including process
models that specify the sequence of steps used to solve a
problem, and “computational-level models” that specify how
a problem would be solved by an ideal observer. This section
argues that the ESM is relevant to both families of models.
We suggested earlier that the computations specified by
the ESM can be carried out using an “extended twin net-
work” like the example shown in Figure 2c. An extended
twin network is a special case of a Bayes net, which means
that arguments about the underlying algorithms and neural
implementations for other Bayes net accounts (e.g., Grif-
fiths, Steyvers, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Gopnik et al., 2004;
Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003) apply
to the ESM as well. To convert a Bayes net into a fully-
specified process model, the network must be supplemented
with an algorithm for carrying out inference over the net-
work. The standard algorithms for inference in Bayes nets
make use of local message-passing along the edges in the
network, and can therefore be viewed as instantiations of the
psychological notion of spreading activation (Pearl, 1994).
Inference over extended twin networks provides one way
to compute the predictions of the ESM, but these predictions
could also be computed by sampling possible worlds from
the distribution specified by the ESM. Sampling has been
widely used to develop process-level accounts of probabilis-
tic inference, and the same general-purpose sampling meth-
ods that have previously been applied to problems includ-
ing categorization, decision-making and sentence processing
can also be applied in our setting (Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn,
2012). A sampling account of counterfactual reasoning is
appealing in part because it captures the intuition that people
consider only a small handful of concrete possibilities when
asked to evaluate a counterfactual claim (Byrne, 2002).
As just suggested, the ESM appears closely related to pre-
vious process models of human reasoning, but our approach
can also be viewed as a contribution at Marr’s “computa-
tional level”. In particular, Appendix A suggests that the
ESM captures the “right” way to make counterfactual infer-
ences assuming that possible worlds are generated from the
branching process described in the appendix. Metaphysical
assumptions of this kind seem to lie beyond the reach of nor-
mative justification, but given the generative assumptions in
Appendix A, the rest of our theory follows from the dictates
of rational probabilistic inference.
Alternative accounts of counterfactual reasoning
Throughout we have compared multiple models of coun-
terfactual reasoning, but all of these models rely on prob-
abilistic inference over causal networks. This section dis-
cusses how our work relates to alternative accounts of coun-
terfactual reasoning.
Possible-worlds approaches. As mentioned earlier, an
influential line of work proposes that counterfactual argu-
ments are evaluated by considering possible worlds that
make the premises true and that are as close as possible to the
real world (Lewis, 1973a; Stalnaker, 1987). This possible-
worlds approach has subsequently influenced several psy-
chological theories of conditional reasoning (Rips & Mar-
cus, 1977; Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2010a).
Possible-worlds accounts can be formalized using imaging,
which is a procedure for adjusting probability distributions in
response to a premise (Lewis, 1976). This section explains
how the ESM can be characterized in terms of an imaging
operation over possible worlds.
In our setting, each possible world corresponds to a setting
of all of the variables (both exogenous and endogenous) in a
functional causal model. For example, in our bacon-cooking
scenario each possible world can be characterized by a vec-
tor that assigns values to all six variables in the functional
model in Figure 1b. A reasoner may have knowledge K that
specifies the values of some variables, but in general she will
be uncertain about others, and her beliefs can be captured us-
ing a distribution P(W |K) that captures her uncertainty about
the true state of the world. For example, suppose that the
reasoner observes that bacon is not cooked, that the alarm
does not activate, and that the neighbors are not disturbed. In
this case P(W |K) assigns nonzero probability to two possible
worlds: one in which cooking bacon would have activated
the alarm (i.e. US = t) and another in which bacon would not
have activated the alarm (US = f ). In both of these worlds,
the remaining variable assignments are B = f , S = f , N = f ,
UB = f , and UN = f .
Suppose that the reasoner now considers the counterfac-
tual conditional “if bacon had been cooked then the neigh-
bors would have been disturbed.” Imaging is a procedure for
adjusting the distribution P(W |K) in light of the premise B =
t to create a new distribution PB(W |K) over worlds (Lewis,
1976). The adjusted distribution assigns nonzero probability
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only to worlds that make the premise B = t true, and adopting
this distribution is therefore a way to determine what would
follow from accepting the premise. In the most basic case,
the adjusted distribution PB(W |K) is generated by shifting
the probability P(W = w|K) assigned to world w to the clos-
est world wB that makes the premise true. For example, con-
sider the world in which conditions were right for B to trigger
the alarm, but B did not occur (B = f , S = f , N = f , UB = f ,
US = t, UN = f ). The probability associated with this world
might be shifted to a world in which B does indeed activate
the alarm (B = t, S = t, N = t, UB = t, US = t and UN = f ).
The probability of the counterfactual conditional “if B then
N” is then defined as PB(N = t|K), or the probability that N
is true according to the adjusted distribution PB(W |K).5
The imaging procedure just described makes use of a sim-
ilarity measure over possible worlds, but does not specify
exactly how this measure should be defined. Pearl’s SM is
a special case of imaging that uses functional causal models
to characterize the world wB that is closest to world w (Pearl,
2000). According to the SM, all exogenous variables in wB
take the same values that they had in w, and all remain-
ing variables are deterministically specified using a func-
tional causal model that reflects an intervention that makes
the premise B = t true.
As characterized so far, imaging assumes that every world
w shifts all of its probability to a unique world wB that is
closer to w than are all other worlds that make the premise
true. Gärdenfors (1988) relaxes this assumption by allowing
a world w to divide its probability among multiple worlds
that make the premise true. He motivates this generalization
by suggesting that the probability of w can be divided among
several worlds that are “equally close” to w. His formaliza-
tion of general imaging, however, allows the probability of
w to be divided among all worlds that make B true, including
those that are both close to and far from w (Gärdenfors 1988,
p. 112).
Our new model can be viewed as a special case of gen-
eral imaging. Consider again our bacon example, and sup-
pose that we are using an extended twin network to reason
about the counterfactual conditional “if B then N,” where the
premise B is treated as a counterfactual observation. The ex-
tended network will be identical to Figure 3a, except that
Figure 3a shows a counterfactual premise involving S rather
than B. The marginal distribution P(W |K) over the left half
of the extended network captures uncertainty about the true
state of the world, and the marginal distribution over the right
half of the network can be interpreted as an adjusted distri-
bution PB(W |K) produced by a general imaging operation.
This operation has the property that each world w divides
its probability among all worlds that are consistent with the
counterfactual premise. The division tends to favor worlds
that are both similar to w and probable a priori, and the sta-
bility parameter s specifies the tradeoff between similarity
and prior probability. In this context, similarity should be in-
terpreted as the extent to which two worlds assign the same
values to the exogenous variables.
Previous authors have pointed out that imaging can be sen-
sitive to both similarity and prior probability (Joyce, 2010;
Pearl, 2010). Joyce (2010, p. 149) suggests that imaging
should involve “the combined effects of judgments of sim-
ilarity among worlds and prior probabilities,” and describes
a procedure called Bayesian imaging that has this property.
Under Bayesian imaging, each world w transfers its proba-
bility to a set of worlds that are all equally close to w, and
the amount of probability received by each world in this set
is proportional to its prior probability. Bayesian imaging can
therefore be viewed as a two step process: first apply similar-
ity to filter out all worlds except those that are close to w, and
then use prior probability to decide how the probability of w
should be distributed over the worlds that remain. This two-
step characterization highlights the fact that Bayesian imag-
ing privileges similarity over prior probability: w can transfer
its probability to worlds with both high and low prior prob-
abilities, but can only transfer its probability to worlds that
are maximally similar to w. The ESM treats similarity and
prior probability in a more balanced way, and allows w to
shift its probability to worlds that are both high and low in
prior probability, and both close to and far from w.
Our comparison between Bayesian imaging and the ESM
highlights the fundamental way in which our approach dif-
fers from previous possible-worlds approaches. To our
knowledge, all of these approaches make the minimality as-
sumption described earlier: they assume that counterfactual
arguments should be evaluated by considering worlds that
depart in minimal respects from the actual world. As we have
discussed, Pearl’s SM and the Minimal Networks Model
make the same assumption. In contrast, the ESM works with
a distribution over counterfactual worlds that assigns non-
zero probability to worlds that are both close to and far from
the actual world. Although non-standard, our approach is
supported by the data that we have presented. In particu-
lar, Experiments 4 and 5 were specifically designed to ask
whether people consider only possible worlds that differ in
minimal respects from the actual world, and the results raise
challenges for any formal account that relies on the minimal-
ity assumption.
Connectionist approaches. Although the probabilistic
approach provides a natural way to incorporate uncertainty
and make graded predictions, the connectionist approach of-
5PB(N|K) is different in general from the conditional proba-
bility P(N|B). For the example in the text, imaging produces
PB(N = t|K) = 0.9, but P(N = t|B = t) = 0.91. The two quantities
differ because the latter allows for possible worlds in which UN = t
and the neighbors are disturbed even though the alarm does not ac-
tivate. These worlds do not contribute to the imaging computation
because knowledge K rules out the possibility that UN = t.
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fers the same advantages. Oaksford and Chater (2010b) have
developed a connectionist model that captures some aspects
of their probabilistic theory of conditional reasoning, and it
may also be possible to develop a connectionist implementa-
tion of the ESM. At present, however, connectionist models
have not been shown to capture the kinds of counterfactual
inferences considered in this paper.
To our knowledge, the only existing connectionist model
of counterfactual reasoning is the µKLONE model developed
by Derthick (1987). Derthick’s model treats counterfactual
conditionals as situations in which one fact — the counter-
factual premise — must be reconciled with other incompat-
ible facts, namely the state of the real world. To achieve
this reconciliation, the model relies on a large number of
hand-coded relationships and constraints, and combines log-
ical and connectionist representations to find configurations
of variables that minimize the strength and number of con-
straints being violated. Importantly, however, the model
is not natively equipped with the capacity to reason about
causal systems like those in our experiments. It may be pos-
sible to apply µKLONE to our experiments by supplying it
with a set of rules and constraints that capture the causal re-
lations and base rates in our scenarios, along with abstract
principles such as the difference between observation and
intervention. Developing these rules and constraints, how-
ever, is a research challenge that goes substantially beyond
the analyses presented by Derthick.
Conclusions
We presented a probabilistic model, the ESM, which ex-
tends and generalizes Pearl’s account of counterfactual rea-
soning. Like Pearl’s account, the ESM does not treat causal
relationships as being inherently stochastic, but instead ex-
plains unpredictable phenomena in terms of exogenous vari-
ables. Unlike Pearl’s account, the ESM allows the values
of these exogenous variables to differ across real and coun-
terfactual worlds. Treating exogenous variables in this way
allows the ESM to go beyond Pearl’s approach by accounting
for backtracking counterfactuals and capturing the difference
between counterfactual interventions and counterfactual ob-
servations.
Although we have argued that the ESM improves on pre-
vious models of counterfactual reasoning, all of the models
evaluated in this paper are similar in one important respect:
all make use of Bayesian networks. The Bayes net approach
is a general framework that has been applied to many aspects
of causal cognition, including causal learning, causal pre-
diction and causal explanation. In all of these cases, causal
cognition is characterized in terms of probabilistic inference
over graph-structured representations. Our work endorses
the view that the same cognitive machinery supports infer-
ences about counterfactual states of affairs.
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Appendix A
Temporal branching and stability
This appendix presents one way in which the ESM’s notion
of stability can be formalized. We will derive Equation 1
from the assumption that worlds are generated by a branch-
ing process that operates through time.
Figure A1 illustrates how this branching process
might produce a tree of possible worlds. At any given time,
the exogenous variables within any given world are set to
specific values, but the values of these variables may evolve
over time. For simplicity, we will assume for now that all
worlds contain a single exogenous variable called U . Let U1
and U2 denote the value of this variable in two worlds, world
1 and world 2. Suppose that the most recent common ances-
tor of these worlds is world 0, and let U0 denote the value of
variable U in world 0.
When branching events occur, the parent world (e.g.
world 0) “splits” into two identical copies (e.g. worlds 1 and
2). Although the two copies are identical immediately after
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U0
U1 U2
l l 
U0       P(U1)
 f      (1-e-l)λ
 t     e-l+(1-e-l)λ
U0       P(U2)
 f      (1-e-l)λ
 t     e-l +(1-e-l)λ
P(U0)
    λ
Figure A1. Graphical depiction of a branching process over
possible worlds.
the split, after that point the two worlds evolve independently
over time. Figure A1 indicates that an interval of length l has
elapsed since world 0 split to form worlds 1 and 2. During
this interval, variable U has evolved independently within
the two worlds, and as a result U1 and U2 may take different
values.
We can formalize the way in which variables change
through time by assuming that the value of a variable at a
given instant depends only on the long-run base rate of that
variable and the value of that variable at the previous instant
of time. In Figure A1, let λ denote the long-run base rate of
variable U . Technically speaking, we assume that variable U
evolves according to a continuous-time Markov chain with
infinitesimal matrix:
Q =
[ −λ λ
1−λ −(1−λ)
]
(2)
The same generative process is widely used as a simple
model of biological evolution (Huelsenbeck & Ronquist,
2001), and has also been used to develop psychological
accounts of generalization (Tenenbaum, Kemp, & Shafto,
2007; Kemp, Shafto, & Tenenbaum, 2012).
Given these assumptions, we can convert the tree in
Figure A1 into a Bayesian network that allows us to compute
the value of variable U at different points in the tree. The
CPD for U0 shows that U is true in world 0 with probability
λ, which is consistent with our assumption that λ is the long-
run base rate of U . Given the value of U0, the CPDs for U1
and U2 show that the values of these variables depend on the
length of the interval l that has elapsed since worlds 1 and 2
separated. If l is very small, then U1 and U2 will be equal to
U0 with high probability. If l is very large, then the values of
U1 and U2 are effectively independent of U0 and are deter-
mined only by the base-rate. The CPDs shown in Figure A1
can be derived from our assumption that variable U evolves
according to the continuous-time Markov chain specified by
Equation 2 (Karlin & Taylor, 1975).
The key component of the ESM is Equation 1 in the
main text, and this equation can be derived from the branch-
ing process just characterized. If world 1 is the actual world
and world 2 is the counterfactual world under consideration,
then the distribution in Equation 1 corresponds to P(U2|U1).
The CPDs in Figure A1 imply that this distribution is
P(U2 = t|U1) =
{
(1− e−2l)λ, if U1 = f
e−2l +(1− e−2l)λ, if U1 = t. (3)
If we set s = e−2l , then Equation 3 can be written as
P(U2 = t|U1) =
{
(1− s)λ, if U1 = f
s+(1− s)λ, if U1 = t, (4)
which can be rewritten in a format that matches Equation 1
in the main text:
P(U2|U1) = sδ(U1)+(1− s)P(U2), (5)
where P(U2 = t) = λ and P(U2 = f ) = 1−λ.
The derivation above demonstrates that the stability
parameter s in Equation 1 can be interpreted as a decreasing
function of the length of time l that has elapsed since the
counterfactual world and the actual world separated. Given
this interpretation, Equation 1 is a direct consequence of the
generative assumptions specified in this appendix.
Until now we have assumed that the worlds under
consideration each contain a single exogenous variable. If
there are multiple exogenous variables, we allow these vari-
ables to have different baserates λi, and assume that these
variables evolve independently according to the generative
process summarized by Figure A1.
The CPDs shown in Figure A1 can be used to com-
plete the specification of the extended twin network shown
in Figure 2c. Figure 2c includes exogenous variables that
belong to the real and counterfactual worlds, and the CPD
for each of these exogenous variables takes the form shown
in Figure A1, where the parameter λ is replaced by the base
rate of the variable in question. Given these CPDs, the ex-
tended twin network in Figure 2c is a fully specified Bayesian
network, and standard algorithms for inference in Bayesian
networks can be used to compute the predictions of the ESM.
The extended twin network in Figure 2c can be
viewed as a Bayesian network that incorporates both tempo-
ral relationships between possible worlds and the causal re-
lationships that exist within each world. Our specification of
this network is formally identical to a previous model of gen-
eralization that incorporates both similarity relationships be-
tween objects and causal relationships between the features
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of these objects (Kemp et al., 2012). Critically, however, the
work of Kemp et al. focuses on variables that belong to the
actual world, whereas the ESM focuses on inferences about
a possible world that differs from the actual world.
The derivation in this section is related to previous
philosophical accounts of counterfactual conditionals that in-
voke the notion of a temporal branching process. McCall
(1984) proposes that possible worlds are organized into a
“continuously-branching tree structure,” and that the simi-
larity between two worlds is determined by the “amount of
common past they share.” Bennett (2003) offers a related
proposal, and suggests that the similarity between two worlds
can be understood by considering the “fork” at which the two
diverged. This appendix can therefore be viewed as an at-
tempt to formalize some intuitions about similarity that have
previously appeared in the philosophical literature.
Appendix B
Functional causal models
As described in the main text, the ESM and the SM both rely
on functional causal models (FCMs). To compute the pre-
dictions of these approaches, we used FCMs that matched
the descriptions of the causal systems that participants read.
In Experiments 1 and 4, the FCMs can be recovered
immediately from the causal graphs in Figure 4a and Fig-
ure 7a, respectively. In Experiment 3, the FCM can be recov-
ered from the causal graph in the deterministic condition in
Figure 6a. For Experiments 2, 5, and 6, the causal graphical
models shown in Figures 6, 9 and 10 do not fully capture the
FCMs implied by the descriptions that participants saw. The
FCMs for these three experiments are shown in Figure B1.
Appendix C
Parameters and model fits
Pearl’s SM and the USM have no free parameters, and the
ESM has a single stability parameter. The MNM has two free
parameters: the first captures the rate at which participants
randomly guess when making their judgments, and the sec-
ond captures the weight that they assign to probabilistic evi-
dence. For each model with free parameters, we used one set
of parameters to model judgments across all six experiments.
The parameters chosen were those that minimized the total
sum squared error of the model relative to the mean subjec-
tive probabilities provided by participants. In addition to the
models described in the main text, we also considered two
variants of the SM. The SM-g allows for random guessing
by fitting a single “guessing rate” parameter to the data. The
SM-go handles default counterfactuals and counterfactual in-
terventions in the same way as the SM-g, but treats coun-
terfactual observations as simple observations (and therefore
handles counterfactual observations in the same way as the
USM).
In our analysis of Rips’s (2010) data, we used pa-
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Figure B1. Graphical representations of the functional causal
models for Experiments 2, 5, and 6. For Experiment 5, nodes
representing the exogenous causes of hormones A and B have
been omitted in the interest of compactness.
rameter values that maximized correlation across mean judg-
ments for Rips’s Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, minus conditions
in Experiment 3 where participants were asked whether out-
comes “necessarily follow” from a counterfactual premise.
Among the parameter values that maximized correlation, we
chose those that produced the lowest sum squared error. For
the ESM, the best-fitting stability parameter was 0.68, while
for the MNM the best fits were associated with a guess-
ing probability of .45 and a probability of using probabilis-
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tic information of .41 in non-guesses. The values of the
MNM parameters that minimized error across our own ex-
periments were .37 and .30, for guessing and probabilistic-
information parameters, respectively. Maximizing correla-
tions alone would have penalized the MNM by failing to op-
timize the MNM’s guessing parameter, because that param-
eter’s value does not influence correlation values unless it is
set to 1.
Because all parameter spaces were at most two-
dimensional, and all parameters fell between 0 and 1, we
used a simple grid search to find parameter values that mini-
mized sum squared error. In the case of one-parameter mod-
els (the ESM, SM-g, SM-go, and mixtures of the USM and
SM), we considered 1000 uniformly spaced parameter val-
ues between 0 and 1. In the case of two-parameter models
(the MNM), we considered 200 values for each parameter,
uniformly spaced between 0 and 1, or 40,000 total combina-
tions.
The main text discusses the sensitivity of our error
rates to choices of the stability parameter. We expand on that
discussion by reporting relative model performances under
cross validation. In cross-validation, a data set is partitioned
into a training set, which is used to estimate a model’s pa-
rameters, and a test set, which is used to evaluate the per-
formance of the model. Fitting parameters and evaluating
models using the same data can lead to inflated estimates
of model performance, and separating training sets from test
sets allows a more accurate comparison of the performance
of different models. In our case, we used 9 partitions, with
data from one scenario set aside for testing in each round. We
used the same fitting procedure that we used for our overall
parameter estimates, described above, with results reported
in the second row of Table C1. This analysis shows that the
good performance of the ESM is not due to testing and fitting
on the same data, but that the mixture model and the MNM
show degraded accuracy under cross-validation. Because the
SM and USM do not have any parameters to fit, their error
rates are unchanged.
In the main text, our model fits are based on estimates
of subjective probabilities that incorporate both forced-
choice responses and reported confidences. We also com-
bined the results of online and in-lab participant groups. Ta-
ble C1 shows that the performance of the ESM remains high
if we look at the different populations (in-lab versus online)
separately and if we use only forced-choice judgments. Fig-
ure C1 shows scatterplots comparing ESM predictions to par-
ticipant judgments across all questions if we separate in-lab
and online populations.
Appendix D
Baseline results
Experiments 1, 2, and 6 included baseline conditions, which
did not frame the questions as counterfactuals and omitted in-
A B A B
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Figure D1. Mean participant judgments for the baseline con-
ditions in Experiments 1, 2, and 6. Error bars represent stan-
dard errors of the means.
formation about the real-world states of the variables. Aside
from these changes, the baseline conditions were identical to
their counterfactual counterparts. Participants’ judgments in
these conditions are summarized in Figure D1. See the de-
scription of Experiment 1 for additional details about these
conditions.
Appendix E
Experimental materials
This appendix includes the descriptions of the causal sys-
tems that were provided to participants and the questions
they were asked. For each system, the questions were asked
in random order.
Experiment 1, observation condition
In a very small number of the mice, hormone A
is present.
In a very small number of the mice, hormone B
is present.
The presence or absence of hormone A does not
depend on the status of hormone B.
The presence or absence of hormone B does not
depend on the status of hormone A.
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Table C1
Model fits as measured by sum squared error across all counterfactual judgments for the Extended Structural Model (ESM),
Structural Model (SM), SM with a guessing parameter (SM-g), SM-g that treats counterfactual observations as simple ob-
servations (SM-go), Unattached Structural Model (USM), Minimal Networks Model (MNM), and the mixed strategies model
(MIX). The first row shows errors for the analysis and populations described in the main text. The second row shows errors
using cross-validation, and the remaining rows show errors under different sub-populations and dependent measures; see the
text in this Appendix for details.
Group ESM SM SM-g SM-go USM MNM MIX
Original analysis 0.28 4.28 1.85 1.49 2.08 0.83 0.46
Cross-validation 0.29 4.28 1.91 1.56 2.08 0.92 0.53
Lab participants 0.40 3.65 1.59 1.33 2.70 0.66 0.59
Online participants 0.27 4.93 2.18 1.73 1.64 1.08 0.45
Forced-choice judgments 0.27 4.95 2.56 2.01 1.89 1.18 0.61
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Figure C1. ESM predictions plotted against mean human judgments from in-lab and online participants, across all Experiments
and questions, excluding manipulation-check questions about the counterfactual premises themselves.
Fred is a mouse from the Tondam Lab. You test
Fred and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone B is definitely present.
For Fred the mouse, if you had observed A to be
absent, would A be present?
For Fred the mouse, if you had observed A to be
absent, would B be present?
Experiment 1, intervention condition
In a very small number of the mice, hormone A
is present.
In a very small number of the mice, hormone B
is present.
The presence or absence of hormone A does not
depend on the status of hormone B.
The presence or absence of hormone B does not
depend on the status of hormone A.
Some mice are raised on regular kibble and oth-
ers are raised on special kibble.
The two kinds of kibble are identical except for
the fact that special kibble contains a substance
that specifically prevents the formation of hor-
mone A.
Martha is a mouse from the Runcible Lab raised
on regular kibble. You test Martha and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone B is definitely present.
For Martha the mouse, if you had raised Martha
on special kibble, would A be present?
For Martha the mouse, if you had raised Martha
on special kibble, would B be present?
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Experiment 2, observation condition
In almost all of the mice, hormone A is absent.
The status of hormone B is caused by the status
of hormone A and nothing else.
In many of the mice, if A is present, this causes
B to be present.
The status of hormone C is caused by the status
of hormone B and nothing else.
In many of the mice, if B is present, this causes
C to be present.
Frank is a mouse from the Nanber Lab. You test
Frank and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone B is definitely present.
Hormone C is definitely present.
For Frank the mouse, if you had observed B to
be absent, would A be present?
For Frank the mouse, if you had observed B to
be absent, would B be present?
For Frank the mouse, if you had observed B to
be absent, would C be present?
Experiment 2, intervention condition
In almost all of the mice, hormone A is absent.
The status of hormone B is caused by the status
of hormone A and nothing else.
In many of the mice, if A is present, this causes
B to be present.
The status of hormone C is caused by the status
of hormone B and nothing else.
In many of the mice, if B is present, this causes
C to be present.
Some mice are raised on regular kibble and oth-
ers are raised on special kibble.
The two kinds of kibble are identical except for
the fact that special kibble contains a substance
that specifically prevents the formation of hor-
mone B.
Nellie is a mouse from the Phroxis Lab raised
on regular kibble. You test Nellie and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone B is definitely present.
Hormone C is definitely present.
For Nellie the mouse, if you had raised Nellie on
special kibble, would A be present?
For Nellie the mouse, if you had raised Nellie on
special kibble, would B be present?
For Nellie the mouse, if you had raised Nellie on
special kibble, would C be present?
Experiment 3, stochastic condition
In some of the mice, hormone A is present.
The status of hormone B is caused by the status
of hormone A and nothing else.
In a very small number of the mice, if A is
present, this causes B to be absent, and if A is
absent, this causes B to be present.
In the remaining mice, if A is present, this
causes B to be present, and if A is absent, this
causes B to be absent.
Ronald is a mouse from the Gostak Lab. You
test Ronald and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone B is definitely not present.
For Ronald the mouse, if A were absent, would
A be present?
For Ronald the mouse, if A were absent, would
B be present?
Experiment 3, deterministic condition
In some of the mice, hormone A is present.
In a very small number of the mice, hormone B
is present.
The status of hormone C is caused by the status
of hormones A and B and nothing else.
If B is absent, this causes C’s status to match
A’s: if A is present, this causes C to be present,
and if A is absent, this causes C to be absent.
If B is present, this causes C’s status to be the
opposite of A’s: if A is present, this causes C to
be absent, and if A is absent, this causes C to be
present.
Florence is a mouse from the Muckenhoupt Lab.
You test Florence and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone C is definitely not present.
For Florence the mouse, if A were absent, would
A be present?
For Florence the mouse, if A were absent, would
B be present?
For Florence the mouse, if A were absent, would
C be present?
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Experiment 4
In almost all of the mice, hormone A is present.
In almost all of the mice, hormone B is present.
The status of hormone C is caused by the status
of hormones A and B and nothing else.
If A is present, this always causes C to be
present.
If B is present, this always causes C to be
present.
The status of hormone D is caused by the status
of hormone C and nothing else.
If C is present, this always causes D to be
present.
Harold is a mouse from the Weyland Lab. You
test Harold and find that:
Hormone A is definitely not present.
Hormone B is definitely not present.
Hormone C is definitely not present.
Hormone D is definitely not present.
For Harold the mouse, if C were present, would
A be present?
For Harold the mouse, if C were present, would
B be present?
For Harold the mouse, if C were present, would
C be present?
For Harold the mouse, if C were present, would
D be present?
Experiment 5
In many of the mice, hormone A is present.
In many of the mice, hormone B is present.
The status of hormone C is caused by the status
of hormones A and B and nothing else.
If hormone A is present, this always causes hor-
mone C to be present.
If hormone B is present, this almost always
causes hormone C to be present.
The presence of hormone D is caused by the
presence of hormone C.
If hormone C is present, this always causes hor-
mone D to be present.
Ilana is a mouse from the Snarp Lab. You test
Ilana and find that:
Hormone A is definitely present.
Hormone B is definitely present.
Hormone C is definitely present.
Hormone D is definitely present.
For Ilana the mouse, if C were absent, would A
be present?
For Ilana the mouse, if C were absent, would B
be present?
For Ilana the mouse, if C were absent, would C
be present?
For Ilana the mouse, if C were absent, would D
be present?
Experiment 6
In some of the mice, hormone A is present.
The status of hormone B is caused by the status
of hormone A and nothing else.
In almost all mice, if A is present, this causes
B to be present, and if A is absent, this causes
B to be absent. In the remaining mice, if A is
present, this causes B to be absent, and if A is
absent, this causes B to be present.
The status of hormone C is caused by the status
of hormone B and nothing else.
In almost all mice, if B is present, this causes C
to be present, and if B is absent, this causes C to
be absent. In the remaining mice, if B is present,
this causes C to be absent, and if B is absent, this
causes C to be present.
Albert is a mouse from the Wrean Lab. You test
Albert and find that:
Hormone A is definitely not present.
Hormone B is definitely not present.
Hormone C is definitely present.
For Albert the mouse, if you had observed B to
be present, would A be present?
For Albert the mouse, if you had observed B to
be present, would B be present?
For Albert the mouse, if you had observed B to
be present, would C be present?
